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ABSTRACT 
Clinical interest in mindfulness theories and interventions for the treatment of 
psychological problems such as anxiety and mood disorders has increased 
dramatically over the last decade. Alongside this interest relatively little attention has 
been paid to the hypothesised mechanisms of mindfulness that result in a 
mindfulness state; practice has outstripped the development of a coherent model of 
the mechanisms. The Decontextualising Model of Mindfulness (DMM) is proposed 
here to address this gap. The DMM suggests that mindfulness techniques operate to 
decontextualise mental events from their web of hierarchically organised levels of 
abstraction and associated meaning, which opens up the cognitive “space” to 
introduce more adaptive strategies. The DMM is evaluated in terms of its ability to 
explain existing theories, cognitive-behaviour therapy, and accepted mechanisms of 
change in psychotherapy. The DMM aims to stimulate deeper understanding of how 
mindfulness works so that (1) Mindfulness-Based Interventions (MBIs) are more 
equipped to induce mindfulness states; (2) the origins of psychopathology may be 
better understood and therefore more effectively treated; and (3) the causes of 
psychological well-being may be made more clear and therefore more readily 
enhanced. The research and theoretical literature as well as the current investigation 
indicate that in particular self-identity and self-compassion are two areas that 
warrant further investigation. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
The Current Paradigm 
Mindfulness is a Buddhist contemplative tradition that may be older than 
Buddhism itself (Harvey, 2012). Mindfulness Based Interventions (MBIs) are a 
Western psychotherapeutic practice that began to emerge only two decades ago 
(Didonna, 2009). Clinical interest in mindfulness theories and interventions for the 
treatment of psychological problems such as anxiety and mood disorders has 
increased dramatically over the past two decades in what can be described as the 
‘mindfulness therapy movement’ (Didonna, 2009; Thera, 2005). The emergence of 
mindfulness techniques as a powerful psychotherapeutic tool can be considered in 
terms of the paradigmatic culmination of historical development from 
psychoanalysis in the nineteenth century to behaviourism and cognitive therapy in 
the twentieth century.  
In the nineteenth century Sigmund Freud pioneered psychotherapy when he 
developed psychoanalysis, or ‘talking therapy’, which was based on his theory that 
the mind is split into three parts: instinctual urges (ID), higher morals (superego) 
and the conscious effort to balance these competing forces (ego) (Sulloway, 1992). 
Freud argued that psychiatric disturbance manifests from unconscious conflict 
between the ID and the superego, along with material repressed in the ID. Freud 
postulated that effective treatment involves an open dialogue between the client and 
the therapist that enables the unconscious to surface into conscious awareness 
(Sulloway, 1992). Freud’s account for the efficacy of psychoanalysis continues to be 
an accepted explanation for the efficacy of psychotherapy.  
Behaviourism developed as a reaction to the perception that psychoanalysis is 
unscientific, because unconscious processes, and indeed anything that occurs in the 
mind, are beyond observation and objective measurement (S. Hayes, Follette, & 
Linehan, 2004). Major contributors to the development of behaviourism recognised 
that in order to have empirical grounding, and therefore credibility, psychology 
needed to be concerned with observable events, in particular, behaviour (O'Donohue 
& Kitchener, 1999). Two of the major contributors, Pavlov and Skinner, found that 
behaviour is under contingency control, meaning that an action is contingent upon 
its consequences (Pavlov, 1927; Skinner, 1938). If behaviour does not have any 
meaningful consequence, or the previous consequence that it had ceases, the 
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behaviour itself eventually desists. The contingency control of behaviour provides a 
framework for clinical psychology to investigate behaviour, including abnormal or 
problematic behaviour, and find methods to change behaviour (O'Donohue & 
Kitchener, 1999). Change at the level of behaviour constitutes ‘first-order’ change, 
meaning that when problems arise in behaviour the focus of treatment is to change 
the problematic behaviour (S. Hayes, V. Follette, et al., 2004). 
 Behaviourism, while therapeutically useful, did not offer insight into the 
influence of human cognitive functioning on behaviour. Cognitive psychology, on the 
other hand, arose directly from the recognition of the significance of human 
cognition on behaviour, and is concerned with mental processes, such as attention, 
memory, perception, language, and thinking (S. Hayes, V. Follette, et al., 2004). 
Aaron Beck, who developed cognitive therapy, argued that psychological distress is 
caused by certain unhelpful thinking patterns, which are alleviated by altering 
associated thinking patterns and implementing particular cognitive coping strategies 
to replace those patterns (Beck, 1967). Alleviating psychological distress by changing 
thinking patterns and styles is known as ‘second order’ change (S. Hayes, V. Follette, 
et al., 2004). 
While cognitive psychology acknowledges thoughts as being pivotal in mental 
health and empirical evidence demonstrates that changing thoughts can improve 
psychological well-being, theorists began to note that it is the function of thoughts, 
rather than the content of thoughts, that is problematic (S. Hayes, V. Follette, et al., 
2004). For example, depression arises from the way an individual deals with a 
negative thought rather than from the mere presence of the negative thought.  
Thoughts can become problematic for people in the psychological context of 
elaborate information processing. It is not the mere presence of the thought itself but 
the reactions to that thought that a person has that creates suffering. As S. Hayes, V. 
Follette, et al. (2004) observed, “a difficult emotion accepted as an emotion will not 
necessarily have a negative function, even though it might in other contexts, such as 
one of resistance, suppression, or behavioural compliance” (p.9). For example, three 
people may have the same negative thought. The first person accepts the thought as 
merely a passing event in his or her mental arena. The second person changes the 
thought using cognitive techniques with no negative repercussions. The third person, 
however, ruminates on the negative thought and as a result develops depression (this 
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is an overly simplified example of the development of depression and is used for 
illustrative purposes only).  
The key concept arising from empirical and theoretical cognitive psychology is 
that cognitive context and the way thoughts and experiences are managed provides a 
key avenue for therapeutic change (S. Hayes, V. Follette, et al., 2004). Mindfulness is 
a practice that directly addresses cognitive context, in particular the way that the 
mind processes thoughts and events. Mindfulness techniques seek to change the 
psychological context of cognition by directing the awareness from an engagement 
with concepts to observation of the presence of concepts.  
Buddhist Origin of Mindfulness 
The historical Buddhist origin of mindfulness provides a foundation for 
understanding the efficacy and theoretical assumptions of MBIs. In particular, 
mindfulness is a contemplative practice that rests on the theoretical foundation of 
the Buddhist ‘three marks of existence’: suffering, which is caused by clinging to the 
illusion of a permanent self; impermanence, meaning that all things are temporary; 
and egolessness, meaning that there is no enduring ‘self’ (Bodhi, 2003). 
Rosch (2007) describes three main assumptions underpinning MBIs that are 
markedly different from usual Western psychological assumptions, namely: [1] 
changing people’s state of consciousness, rather than the contents of that 
consciousness, reduces suffering; [2] interpreting experience in relation to the self-
concept is detrimental; and [3] the present moment is the only point in time that 
exists and therefore attempting to orient oneself outside of the present is problematic 
and can produce distress.  
In terms of the historical context of mindfulness, the interrelationship of key 
concepts that accounts for the efficacy of MBIs is the relief of suffering through non-
association of a sense of self with transitory mental events. These key concepts 
provide the basis for a coherent theoretical account for the efficacy of mindfulness 
techniques, which aim to bring about the realisation that events in the mind are 
transitory and do not constitute the self.  
The Gap 
Mindfulness techniques are efficacious and increasingly used in clinical 
settings. The efficacy of mindfulness techniques has been demonstrated frequently 
with diverse lines of investigation, from neuroscience to metacognition and concepts 
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of the self (Bränström, Kvillemo, & Åkerstedt, 2013; Didonna, 2009; S. Hayes, V. 
Follette, et al., 2004; S. Hayes, Masuda, Bissett, Luoma, & Guerrero, 2004; Kerr, 
Sacchet, Lazar, Moore, & Jones, 2013; Luberto, Cotton, McLeish, Mingione, & 
O’Bryan, 2013; Piet & Hougaard, 2011; S. L. Shapiro & Carlson, 2009; Teasdale et al., 
2002) and the clinical uses of mindfulness techniques “encompass a broad range of 
ideas and practices” (Didonna, 2009, p. 18).  
The incorporation of mindfulness techniques into psychotherapy is a positive 
step but is one that has been taken without comprehensive understanding of the 
psychological mechanisms underpinning its efficacy. The theoretical literature and 
the theoretical framework for MBIs that are at the forefront of the mindfulness 
therapy movement provide incomplete accounts of the mechanisms of action in 
mindfulness techniques. In particular, there is no overall coherent account of the 
processes that underpin the mechanisms of mindfulness. The absence of this 
understanding is problematic in that it creates a number of clinical risks, including 
the following: 
1. Inability to tailor and systematically implement treatment due to the lack of a 
necessary framework for investigating why a client may be resistant to change when 
using mindfulness techniques. 
2. Using a technique that may not fundamentally serve treatment goals, which 
arguably weakens the scientist-practitioner model of clinical psychology. 
3. Partial use of a technique with attendant loss of fundamental components pivotal 
in treatment efficacy. 
4. Use of mindfulness techniques with incongruent techniques such as cognitive 
therapies.  
5. Distorted use of mindfulness techniques.  
The current paper examines the major accounts of how mindfulness 
interventions are thought to work and proposes a unifying model, the 
Decontextualising Model of Mindfulness (DMM), in an attempt to provide a 
coherent overall theoretical framework for the psychological processes that underpin 
the mechanisms of mindfulness. The DMM considers self-concept, self-compassion, 
and the psychological underpinnings of the state of mindfulness itself.  
At this point it is important to define and clarify precisely what ‘mindfulness’ 
means in the context of this paper. Although this has been done extensively 
elsewhere, prior definitions of mindfulness vary to a certain degree.  
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Meaning of Mindfulness  
Mindfulness as a Technique 
 In the psychological literature mindfulness techniques are typically described 
as “paying attention, on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally, to 
things as they are” (Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Kabat-Zinn, 2007, p. 47). 
Mindfulness techniques involve becoming aware of sensations, thoughts, and 
feelings (that is, events in the mind) without interpreting them or endowing them 
with meaning or significance. Mindfulness techniques require observation of events 
in the mind without engaging in elaborate, evaluative cognitive processing that 
judges things as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  
 The Buddhist concept of mindfulness identifies two distinct yet related 
constituent components of mindfulness, namely, concentration (samatha in Pāli) 
and insight (vipassana in Pāli). The samatha concentration technique is the focus of 
“attention on the object of meditation to the exclusion of everything else” (Grabovac, 
Lau, & Willett, 2011, p. 158), whereas the vipassana insight technique involves the 
“moment-by-moment observing of the three characteristics (impermanence, 
suffering, and not-self) of the meditation object” (Grabovac et al., 2011, p. 157).  
These two concepts are often conflated in the psychological discourse on 
mindfulness, which overlooks the important distinction between two different 
processes that may have different implications for the outcomes of mindfulness 
practice (Grabovac et al., 2011). Grabovac et al. (2011) used the vipassana insight 
description to define mindfulness and, while admitting that mindfulness involves 
samatha concentration, posited that the main point of difference between vipassana 
and samatha is the focus of the two techniques, with the efficacy of mindfulness 
techniques being due to a focus on vipassana insight. Grabovac et al. (2011) defined 
the three characteristics of the focus of vipassana insight as follows: 
1. Sense impressions and mental events are transient (they arise and pass 
away)  
2. Habitual reactions (i.e., attachment and aversion) to the feelings of a 
sense impression or mental event, and a lack of awareness of this 
process, lead to suffering  
3. Sense impressions and mental events do not contain or constitute any 
lasting, separate entity that could be called a self. (p. 156). 
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Empirical evidence and theory support these observations by Grabovac et al. (Baer, 
2003; 2011; Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Kerr, Josyula, & Littenberg, 2011) 
The “permanent, radical change in perspective” (p. 159) resulting from the 
practice of mindfulness techniques noted by Grabovac et al. (2011) accords with the 
‘state of being’ ensuing from the repeated formal practice or deliberate employment 
of the technique of mindfulness reported by Kabat-Zinn (1982). 
Mindfulness as a State 
Several authors concur that a mindfulness state is characterised by a particular 
state of consciousness (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007a, 
2007b; Carmody, Baer, Lykins, & Olendzki, 2009; Gunaratana, 2011; Hollis-Walker 
& Colosimo, 2011; Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Leary, Adams, & Tate, 2006). There is a vast 
literature on the topic of consciousness, however in this paper the typical Western 
psychological meaning is intended, as the usual waking state of a person (Walsh & 
Vaughan, 1993).  
Researchers and mindfulness practitioners alike claim that in a mindfulness 
state the self is identified as the observer of experience rather than as the experience 
itself (Hölzel et al., 2011; Kerr et al., 2011). Goleman (1971) proposes that when 
awareness is brought to the presence of the contents of consciousness, they are 
considered as insubstantial events that given their transitory nature do not provide 
an enduring self-concept with which to identify. They are known to be simply 
impulses of perception occurring within awareness that arise in response to external 
and internal stimuli. Hölzel et al. (2011) explain that in a mindfulness state of 
consciousness, individuals recognise that the contents of their consciousness, that is, 
what they are aware of, are distinct from themselves as the observer of those 
contents. ‘Awareness of awareness’ is known as meta-awareness (Wells & Matthews, 
1994) and provides a perspective with which to identify and from which to operate. 
The observer becomes a person’s self-identity. Kerr et al. (2011) found that in their 
diary study of participants in an MBSR program all of the participants reported “the 
emergence of an observing self” (p. 80).  
The process of acknowledging events in the mind as not necessarily true or 
accurate representations of reality, and as ‘merely thoughts’, is known as 
‘decentering’. Although decentering already exists in the psychological discourse on 
cognitive therapy, unlike in mindfulness, it has been used therein “as a means to 
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changing thought content, rather than as an end in itself” (Segal et al., 2013, p.36). 
Additionally, it has not been used as a platform to develop a new self-identity from. 
Hölzel et al. (2011) propose that through acknowledgment of events in the 
mind as separate to the self, “self-referential processing (i.e. the narrative of the 
relevance of the stimulus for oneself) becomes diminished, while first-person 
experiencing becomes enhanced” (p. 549). In a mindfulness state, rather than 
thinking-about experience as it pertains to the self-concept, sensations of experience 
are attended to as they arise and are not interpreted as the self.  
Olendzki (2013) explains that continuously responding to conditioned and 
habitual reaction patterns in the search of pleasure and avoidance of pain removes 
the choice to act otherwise. He states that conversely, a mindfulness state is 
characterised by equanimity, which involves a lack of attraction or aversion to 
stimuli, since it is no longer relevant to the self-concept. Grabovac et al. (2011) argue 
that an additional “consequent decrease in mental proliferation” (p. 159) follows 
equanimity and the cessation of relating stimuli to the self-concept. The decrease in 
elaborate cognitive processing can be likened to a cognitive ‘space’ that Neff (2003b) 
suggests is necessary to introduce self-compassion, which is also characteristic of a 
mindfulness state. Self-compassion involves a kind, understanding attitude towards 
oneself and is highly implicated in mindfulness (Neff, 2003b). As such, it is further 
explored and addressed in the following chapters.  
Thesis Overview 
This paper evaluates current theories of the mechanisms of mindfulness and 
proposes the Decontextualising Model of Mindfulness (DMM) as an explanation for 
the efficacy of Mindfulness-Based Interventions (MBIs)  
Chapter one outlined the historical context of psychotherapy in terms that 
identify the groundwork for the introduction of mindfulness. The chapter also 
considered mindfulness both as a state and a technique, the distinction between 
which has different theoretical and practical implications for the proposed DMM.  
Chapter two presents and evaluates the main MBIs and theories of how they 
work along with purely theoretical accounts of the mechanisms of mindfulness, from 
which five core mechanisms are identified and discussed, namely, attention, 
intention, attitude, awareness/meta-awareness, and self-compassion. 
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Chapter three introduces and explains the DMM, examines how the DMM 
relates to mindfulness, and uses depression as an example of how mindfulness 
operates in treatment.  
Chapter four evaluates the DMM for its ability to explain existing theories, 
cognitive-behaviour therapy, and key mechanisms of change in psychotherapy. The 
chapter also evaluates the DMM for its adequacy as a theory using epistemic values. 
The paper concludes with a summary of key points and an overview of the 
clinical utility and limitations of the DMM, and suggestions for future research.  
Chapter Conclusion 
Mindfulness is both a technique and a state induced through the use of that 
technique. This chapter has outlined operational definitions of mindfulness, with a 
distinction between mindfulness techniques and a mindfulness state. It has also 
provided a summary of the psychotherapeutic history that created the climate within 
which mindfulness was introduced, and suggested that the mindfulness literature 
has developed in the absence of sound theory of the mechanisms of change. The next 
chapter outlines and evaluates the theoretical developments that have been made by 
researchers in the field. It explains and examines the respective authors’ theoretical 
accounts of how Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1982), 
Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2013) and 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (S. Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) are 
intended to alleviate the symptoms of psychopathology, along with theories of the 
mechanisms of mindfulness proposed by S. L. Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, and Freedman 
(2006) and Hölzel et al. (2011), and the relevant theoretical adjuncts offered by Baer, 
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, and Toney (2006) and Brown et al. (2007b). 1 The 
following chapter also extracts, identifies and describes the core mechanisms of 
mindfulness as postulated by the above theorists.  
                                                   
1 Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (Linehan, 1993a, 1993b) incorporates mindfulness techniques but 
does not add anything of theoretical relevance for present purposes and so is excluded from this 
review. 
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CHAPTER 2 – REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE 
MECHANISMS INVOLVED IN MINDFULNESS INTERVENTIONS 
Intervention developers and theorists provide accounts of how the 
mechanisms of action in mindfulness operate to produce beneficial effects and 
alleviate psychological distress, and contribute to the theoretical understanding of 
the essential components of mindfulness practice, which are outlined below. The 
following section describes and evaluates the existing accounts of the mechanisms of 
mindfulness.  
Mechanisms of Mindfulness 
Mindfulness Based Interventions 
 A number of different MBIs have been developed over the past 23 years, and 
mindfulness intervention techniques from these programs are often selected by 
clinicians and widely incorporated into treatment plans tailored to individuals 
(Didonna, 2009). Given the widespread use of mindfulness techniques, it is 
important to conceptualise the possible mechanisms by which they may be 
efficacious.  
Mindfulness-based stress reduction. 
 Kabat-Zinn (1982, 1990) developed the first mindfulness-based program, 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), which was originally used in a pain 
clinic “to train chronic patients in self-regulation” (Kabat-Zinn, 1982, p. 33). 
Mindfulness meditation is taught with instructions to observe sensations and note 
their transitory nature. Kabat-Zinn (1982) postulates that mindfulness meditation 
involves an attentional shift towards observation and away from reactivity, which he 
argues leads to an ‘uncoupling’ of the link between the experience of the pain 
sensation and the subsequent “affective evaluative alarm reaction” (p. 33).  
 Kabat-Zinn (1982) suggests that suspension of the normal reactions to 
internal events is an example of therapeutic exposure. Attention is paid to internal 
sensations while judgment is withheld and doing so leads to the realisation that there 
are no catastrophic consequences from sensations themselves. Sensations are 
different from reactions to sensations, and are therefore more easily tolerated.  
 Kabat-Zinn (1982) claims that practicing mindfulness involves relating to 
experience with openness and acceptance, which fosters the development of an 
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awareness of internal reactivity. He argues that this awareness leads to ‘cognitive 
reappraisal’, or a change in the relationship to experience, in that “no mental event is 
accorded any content value” (p. 35) and subsequently reactions to internal events 
“lose considerable power and urgency simply by being observed” (p. 35). Thoughts 
are neither regarded as highly important and meaningful in the ways that they used 
to be, nor do they cause the same distress. Thus, openness and acceptance promote 
more effective coping. 
 Kabat-Zinn (1982) has provided a succinct explanation for how MBSR works. 
However, it is not clear how the ‘uncoupling’ of experience and reactivity actually 
happens psychologically as a consequence of the techniques involved. Furthermore, 
how exactly this leads to the creation of the state of mindfulness is not made explicit. 
Overall, Kabat-Zinn’s account makes intuitive sense, but lacks an explanation of the 
core underlying psychological processes.  
Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, and Walach (2004) conducted a meta-analysis 
including 20 empirical studies which demonstrate that MBSR significantly improves 
mental and physical health, as measured by standardised self-report questionnaires 
and clinical observation. For example, following completion of an MBSR program, 
participants experienced a reduction in mental and physical difficulties associated 
with pain, cancer, heart disease, depression and anxiety.  
While this meta-analysis provides support for the efficacy of MBSR in both 
everyday life and extreme cases of difficulty and disturbance, there were no measures 
of participants’ changes in mindfulness, and it is therefore not clear that mindfulness 
is the aspect of MBSR that is efficacious, or how it may be efficacious. Moreover, the 
authors themselves point out the need to investigate the underlying mechanisms of 
the efficacy of mindfulness techniques. 
Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for depression. 
 Segal et al. (2013) developed Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for 
depression (MBCT). MBCT targets relapse in people who have been depressed, and 
the authors claim that it does so by training attention regulation.  
Segal et al. (2013) base their rationale for the efficacy of MBCT on their model 
of depression relapse. According to this model, depression involves a pattern of 
thinking known as ‘rumination’ that is characterised by repetitive and often 
negatively valenced thoughts about the causes and consequences of ones distress that 
does not result in problem solving but instead repeats itself (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
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Rumination is established and strengthened during the first depressive episode, and 
relapse results when a trigger reactivates rumination (such as low mood). The 
authors claim that rumination creates mental pathways, or ‘loops’, that are 
strengthened each time they are mentally rehearsed, and so with each subsequent 
relapse, the loop is strengthened, and relapse likelihood increases (for a review of the 
relevant literature, see Segal et al., 2013). Rumination pathways are likened to loops 
because once entered, rather than solving the ‘problem’ of low mood, they have the 
paradoxical effect of increasing feelings of low mood and distress. An increase in low 
mood increases the desire to resolve it. A belief that the problem will be resolved by 
thinking about it creates a self-perpetuating ‘loop’ maintaining the use of ruminative 
thinking patterns.  
 Segal et al. (2013) account for the problematic nature of rumination with what 
they refer to as “modes of mind” (p. 67). The authors argue that modes of mind 
underpin the way that people think and behave. There are two main modes, ‘doing’ 
and ‘being’. As the name suggests, the function of the doing mode is to get things 
done. To do so, the way that things are is compared to the way that one wants them 
to be. If one detects a discrepancy, one completes an action to reduce that 
discrepancy. For example, a person may decide to tidy a room. An unmade bed and 
clothes on the floor indicates a discrepancy between the way things are, and the way 
the person wishes them to be. To reduce the discrepancy, the person puts the clothes 
away and makes the bed.  
According to Segal et al. (2013) ‘doing’ mode is adaptive when that which is 
being evaluated for discrepancy reduction is impersonal and external, but that its use 
can become highly maladaptive when applied to personal and internal worlds. The 
authors dubbed the latter ‘driven-doing’ and reason that it can become maladaptive 
because thinking about a discrepancy within oneself does not necessarily resolve the 
discrepancy. That is, the mind “dwell[s] on the discrepancy and rehearse[s] possible 
ways to reduce it” (p.69), without reaching any resolution when the person is unable 
to change the internal world from the way it is to the way they wish it to be. The 
discrepancy remains unresolved, and due to this, the mind remains in the driven-
doing mode, with the focus on failing to be the person one wishes to be, which 
subsequently generates negative feelings. Additionally, the authors argue that it is 
very difficult to let go of discrepancies in the internal arena as they have such high 
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implications for self-identity. This is another mechanism that maintains the use of 
‘driven-doing’, or rumination.  
For example, a man in ‘driven-doing’ mode has recently ended a relationship. 
He wishes that he felt happy but instead he feels low mood. There is a discrepancy 
between the way that he feels and the way that he wants to feel, and he believes that 
the only way to feel happy and reduce the discrepancy is to think about his low mood 
and how he might resolve it. Thinking about it highlights the discrepancy that exists, 
which generates lower mood because it is clear that he is failing to be who he wishes 
to be, and that reduction in mood in turn exacerbates the discrepancy. This creates a 
cycle, or a ‘loop’ that he becomes mentally trapped in. 
Segal et al. (2013) point out that in ‘doing’ mode or ‘driven-doing’ mode the 
present moment becomes simply a means to an end – a vehicle in which to reduce 
discrepancies. Thus, the only aspects of the present moment that are attended to are 
those that are relevant to the goal (which, when the goal is entirely internal, may be 
nothing external at all – and this is perhaps how ‘automatic pilot’ operates, where a 
person can drive home and upon arrival have no recollection of the drive). 
Segal et al. (2013) present the ‘being’ mode as “‘accepting’ and ‘allowing’ what 
is, without any immediate pressure to change it” (p. 72). When experience is allowed, 
there is “no need to evaluate experience in order to reduce discrepancies between 
actual and desired states” (p. 72). When the present moment is not treated as a 
means to an end and instead as an ends in itself, more aspects of the current 
experience are attended to, since attention is not narrowly focussed only on that 
which is relevant to a goal. The authors explain that the ‘being’ mode does not denote 
a cessation of actions, but rather that it encompasses a different way of doing things: 
attending to the way that things are and accepting that. For example, a woman 
driving home in ‘doing’ mode becomes frustrated by aspects of the environment that 
delay the fulfilment of the goal of getting home, such as slow traffic, red lights, and a 
pedestrian on the crossing. Another woman is driving home in ‘being’ mode and also 
comes to slow traffic, red lights, and a pedestrian. However she does not become 
frustrated with her experience of driving home, because she accepts it as it is, 
without comparing it to an internal model of how it ‘should’ be. She also notices 
other aspects of her environment that are not relevant to the goal of getting home. 
The authors reason that both entering the ruminative loop created in the 
‘driven-doing’ mode and the loop itself can be disrupted and terminated by learning 
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to recognise when it is activated, and relating to it with acceptance and non-
reactivity, while having the choice to re-direct attention elsewhere. The authors 
postulate that MBCT teaches skills of exiting the ‘doing’ mode and entering the 
‘being’ mode. To teach participants to do so, mindfulness meditation and 
psychoeducation are used. The program targets relationship to thoughts and feelings 
(both physical and emotional) via decentering– participants are taught to view 
thoughts as simply transitory events, and to not give them any undue importance as 
truth or fact. The authors argue that this is a realisation that comes about from 
observing thoughts and feelings non-judgmentally, and noting that they arise and 
pass away. In this way the program allegedly teaches people a new way to relate to 
their inner experience, and how to manage it by re-directing the focus of their 
attention.  
Segal et al. (2013) sought to explain the process of change in MBCT, noting in 
particular Kuyken et al.’s (2010) finding that the positive outcomes of MBCT were 
mediated by mindfulness and self-compassion gains. Self-compassion was measured 
with the Self-Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003a), which includes dimensions of 
awareness, self-kindness, self-judgment (reverse scoring), and recognition of the 
commonality of the human experience. Self-compassion accounted for the cessation 
of the relationship between internal reactions and depressive symptoms in that 
internal reactivity predicted depressive symptoms, but this relationship decreased as 
self-compassion levels increased. Self-compassion is clearly a key component of 
MBCT, but the underlying mechanism by which it works is not adequately addressed.   
Although Segal et al.’s (2013) account of depression is grounded in theory and 
research, the ‘modes of mind’ is speculative and perhaps over-complicates the 
process of mindfulness while adding little to a cohesive explanation for what 
underpins the change that takes place in mindfulness practice, or indeed how this 
change comes to bear. Furthermore, the authors cite an important study that 
demonstrates the apparent central role of self-compassion in changes following a 
MBCT program, yet do not attempt to integrate self-compassion into their account of 
how MBCT works. Also, it is not obvious how this could be done.  
The National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) recommends MBCT as 
treatment for relapse-prevention in depression, for use with those who are currently 
well but have been previously depressed 3 or more times (NICE, 2009). Teasdale et 
al. (2000) conducted a study on the efficacy of MBCT as a relapse prevention 
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program and found that it halved the relapse rate in those who had previously 
experienced depression 3 or more times (compared with treatment as usual; TAU). 
However, no effect beyond equivalence to TAU was found for those who had been 
previously depressed only twice.  
Teasdale et al. (2003) argue that MBCT specifically targets autonomous 
reactivation of depressive thought patterns. These depressive thought patterns are 
created during the first depressive episode and then reactivated and thus 
strengthened in every subsequent depressive episode. This strengthening is one 
explanation for why the likelihood of relapse increases in relation to increases in the 
number of times a person has been depressed.  
Additionally, the number of times a person has been depressed is inversely 
related to the role that external events play in triggering relapse (Ingram, Atchley, & 
Segal, 2011). An external event is not required to reactivate depressive thinking 
patterns and consequent relapse in those depressed 3 or more times. For them, the 
experience of dysphoric mood may be enough to trigger a relapse. When this link 
between internal events and depressive thought patterns is not well established both 
MBCT and TAU are equally efficacious. Nevertheless, when the connection is strong, 
MBCT perhaps addresses the problem more directly than TAU.  
However, Teasdale et al. (2000) did not measure levels of mindfulness or the 
different traits that constitute mindfulness of the participants in their study. Thus it 
remains unclear as to whether mindfulness was the mechanism of change, and if it 
was, what aspect(s) of mindfulness were indeed driving the effects of the 
intervention. In this instance hypotheses regarding how mindfulness operates are 
purely speculative. Moreover, they do not provide an underlying explanation for the 
difference in the efficacy of MBCT for participants depressed twice versus three or 
more times.  
Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT). 
 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; S. Hayes et al., 1999) does not 
explicitly and formally require the practice of mindfulness meditation but instead 
incorporates principles from mindfulness in the overall approach and is therefore 
theoretically relevant and thus addressed here.  
ACT is a behavioural approach based on the Relational Frame Theory (RFT) 
proposed by S. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche (2001). S. Hayes, V. Follette, et al. 
(2004) explain RFT: 
 15 
  Human beings are extraordinarily able to learn to derive and combine 
stimulus relationships and to bring them under arbitrary contextual 
control. These derived stimulus relations, in turn, alter the functions of 
events that participate in relational networks – a process that is also under 
contextual control. Together, these features are argued to form the 
foundation of human language and higher cognition. (p. 10).  
RFT describes a possible explanation for how the acquisition of language enables 
humans to think about their experience, including that which is not immediately in 
front of them; that which is hypothetical, in the past and in the future. The authors 
propose that the ability to use language to guide thinking beyond the present equips 
people with a rich verbal psychological landscape of easy-to-use tools that can 
expand the ways in which they interact with their environment. However, the 
authors also conjecture that it could limit people by creating constraints through the 
control that contextually bound associations have over their behaviour (S. Hayes, 
Masuda, et al., 2004). 
 S. Hayes, Follette, et al. (2004) proffer ACT as a solution to this problem, as 
ACT promotes psychological flexibility where the client is empowered to choose their 
behaviour and responses, rather than act reflexively from learned and inflexible ways 
of thinking and doing. Flexibility is achieved through techniques incorporating 
psychoeducation about thought suppression; mindfulness techniques such as 
observing thoughts; reframing the client’s sense of self and perspective; practicing 
acceptance; making values explicit and thus bringing them into conscious awareness; 
and making specific commitments to practice alternative behaviour patterns (S. 
Hayes et al., 1999).  
 While RFT, the underlying theoretical rationale for ACT, provides an account 
of how the mind is structured through language and how psychological difficulties 
may arise because of the structure, it does not explain the functional utility of this 
underlying mechanism and how mindfulness works therein to produce therapeutic 
change. The strong evidence for RFT (reviewed in S. Hayes et al., 2001) and the 
efficacy of ACT (reviewed in S. Hayes, A. Masuda, et al., 2004) along with the 
similarities between ACT, MBSR and MBCT, indicates that there may be a common 
underlying mechanism that these MBIs tap into. A key theme seems to be that 
psychological distress is a product of thinking about experience rather than directly 
experiencing it (S. Hayes, Masuda, et al., 2004).  
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Summary. 
 The developers of the interventions outlined above have offered their own 
accounts of how mindfulness produces therapeutic changes, which is important in 
order for the technique described to be usable. Clinicians need to understand what 
the techniques they are using are intended to do, so that they can implement them 
competently with the appropriate clients and also monitor change. There are 
common threads woven throughout the authors’ accounts of how mindfulness works, 
and theorists’ attempts to develop explanations that unite these underlying 
mechanisms are addressed below. 
Mindfulness Theories 
The major theoretical approaches to date have tended to produce lists of 
primary mechanisms and their outcomes. They do so without providing a 
comprehensive theoretical account of how the primary mechanisms are integrated, 
create mindfulness mental states, or promote therapeutic change, and by 
implication, point to ways in which symptoms of psychopathology are generated. 
Only two theories proposed by S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) and Hölzel et al. (2011) 
have moved beyond a list approach and provide an overarching model that suggests 
how the primary mechanisms could interact to produce the outcomes commonly 
observed following mindfulness training. Baer et al.’s (2006) and Brown et al.’s 
(2007b) accounts of the mechanisms of mindfulness are primarily lists but do add to 
the more cohesive theories and are thus also addressed below.  
S. L. Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, and Freedman (2006). 
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) propose what they call the three ‘axioms’ (referred 
to as principles henceforth) that they argue occur simultaneously to produce the 
process that is mindfulness. The principles are: intention, attention, and attitude. 
The authors derived these principles from Kabat-Zinn’s (1994) definition of 
mindfulness: “Paying attention [attention] in a particular way [attitude]: On purpose 
[intention], in the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (p.4).  
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) assert that attention involves directing the focus of 
awareness, which utilises the skills of sustained attention (maintaining attention for 
a long period of time), switching (directing attention at will), and cognitive inhibition 
(refraining from engaging in certain cognitions) (see S. L. Shapiro et al., 2006). 
According to the authors, intention is “why one is practicing” (p. 376). It involves a 
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“personal vision” of what one hopes to obtain or achieve from practicing mindfulness 
(p. 375). D. H. Shapiro (1992) found that meditators’ intentions for practicing 
meditation were directly correlated with them obtaining their intended outcome, and 
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) cite this as evidence of the pivotal role of intention. 
Attitude involves the qualities of attention; it is “how we attend” (S. L. Shapiro et al., 
p. 376). In other words, attitude is the affective and evaluative component directed 
towards a particular object or activity (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) S. L. Shapiro et al. 
(2006) claim that an attitude of “patience, compassion, and non-striving” (p. 377) is 
essential for effective mindfulness practice as this attitude results in cultivating the 
ability to not cling to pleasure or avoid and suppress pain.  
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) hypothesise that “intentionally attending with 
openness and non-judgmentalness leads to a significant shift in perspective … 
termed reperceiving” (p. 377). Reperceiving is the adoption of the observer 
perspective, which entails becoming aware of the contents of consciousness and its 
transience, with the self as the observer (i.e. meta-awareness). Reperceiving is 
essentially the realisation “that the phenomena contemplated are distinct from the 
mind contemplating them” (Goleman & Davidson, 1979, p. 134). 
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) propose that reperceiving leads to improved self-
regulation, values clarification, cognitive, emotional, and behavioural flexibility, and 
a situation of exposure. The authors suggest that self-regulation improves because – 
via reperceiving – one is able to observe the contents of his or her consciousness and 
in doing so become aware of internal reactions that may have previously governed 
behaviour. These internal reactions then become information that the person can 
choose how to respond to, rather than simply habitually react to. Additionally, 
internal states are viewed as impermanent, and it is consequently recognised that to 
regulate them, not action but observation and acceptance are sufficient. Indeed, 
Brown and Ryan (2003) found that participants who scored higher on a measure of 
mindfulness also reported greater self-regulation.  
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) claim that values clarification follows reperceiving 
because individuals are able to be aware of the aspects of their mental arena that 
govern their actions, including values. Values are often conditioned, automatically 
reacted to, and not considered in terms of their helpfulness or usefulness in the 
current personal context (S. L. Shapiro et al., 2006). As Wilber (1993) so aptly put it, 
“the fact that one can comprehensively look at them [mental events] means that one 
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has ceased using them as something with which to look at, and thus distort, reality” 
(p. 29). According to S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) an objective consideration of what 
values drive behaviour allows clarification of the values that are present, and 
subsequently, the freedom to choose which values to keep, which to alter in order to 
better serve needs and interests, and which to discard altogether.  
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) explain that cognitive, emotional, and behavioural 
flexibility arise because “learning to see clearly…depends upon the ability to 
disidentify from prior patterns and beliefs” (p. 381). They suggest that dis-
identification with mental events occurs in reperceiving. In other words, there is a 
realisation that awareness is separate from mental events. Self-identity is then 
derived from the observer perspective rather than from mental concepts (S. L. 
Shapiro et al., 2006). The authors state that identifying with meta-awareness allows 
for adaptive responding that is appropriate to the present situation and not based on 
past conditioning.  
Finally, the authors propose that pairing awareness of the contents of 
consciousness with non-reactivity creates a situation of exposure. In this scenario, 
contents of consciousness that were hitherto avoided or reacted to are now able to 
feature in the mental arena and be observed sans reaction. The authors propose that 
exposure reduces and eliminates the ability of events in the mind to elicit a reaction, 
as the person realises that they are not actually threatening. In behaviourist terms, 
the result is extinction, which means that the stimulus (thoughts or feelings) no 
longer elicits a response.  
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) fundamentally assert that intention, attention, and 
attitude underpin all of the subsequent effects of mindfulness. They argue that these 
principles create a process that produces the realisation that one’s consciousness is 
separate from the contents of consciousness, and that this results in improved self-
regulation, values clarification, and improved cognitive, behavioural, and emotional 
flexibility. It also serves to successfully expose individuals to previously troubling 
internal states.  
S. L. Shapiro et al.’s (2006) theory is elegant and accounts for a range of 
phenomena. It extracted three core components of the process of mindfulness. 
However, it does not address what underpins the process and thus how it operates 
psychologically to produce fundamental changes, which is problematic because the 
theory tells us little about psychological functioning and therefore does not provide a 
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framework from which to implement the process in a systematic and nuanced 
manner.  
Hölzel et al. (2011). 
Hölzel et al. (2011) provide a second comprehensive model of the processes 
involved in the creation of mindfulness states. They present an enhanced self-
regulation, mutually facilitative phase model of the mechanisms of mindfulness. 
They postulate that mindfulness practice involves learning to sustain attention [1] on 
a chosen aspect of experience, a large component of which is attention regulation, or 
noticing when attention strays from the intended focus and re-directing it back. The 
focus of attention is usually on an aspect of internal experience, and the authors 
argue that by sustaining attention here, awareness of the body [2] increases. The 
authors suggest that emotion regulation [3] in the form of reappraisal [3.1] is used, 
in which the experience is reinterpreted as “beneficial, meaningful, or benign” (p. 
544). Reappraisal is essentially a change in attitude. The authors suggest that further 
emotion regulation occurs via exposure, extinction, and reconsolidation [3.2]. That 
is, through becoming aware of, accepting and not judging experience, a situation of 
exposure occurs whereby the person allows experience to arise without engaging in 
the usual avoidance behaviour (e.g. attempting to suppress the thought, or through 
some kind of external coping strategy). Hölzel et al. (2011) argue that extinction 
occurs because meditation typically leads to relaxation, and pairing a relaxed state 
with previously feared stimuli (in this case, internal experience) puts the reactivity to 
that stimulus into extinction.  
 Hölzel et al. (2011) claim that, following the above process, “rather than being 
stuck in the habitual reactions to the external and internal environment, the 
meditator can experience the transitory nature of all related perceptions, emotions, 
or cognitions in each moment of experience” (p. 549), and that this “leads to a 
change in the perspective on the self [4]” (p. 549). That is, the process of practicing 
mindfulness techniques affords one the realisation that mental events are transitory 
and that one’s consciousness is distinct from the contents of consciousness (that is, 
meta-awareness). This twin realisation results in a shift in perspective on the self 
such that identification with the internal narrative diminishes, and identification 
with the self as the enduring observer of the narrative arises.  
Hölzel et al. (2011) view self-compassion as an additional factor in creating 
mindfulness, and state that it may be involved in both emotion regulation and the 
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shift in perspective on the self. They suggest that self-compassion has its effects 
through the process of generating feelings of kindness towards oneself (emotion 
regulation) and through reappraising experience in terms of the common experience 
of humanity. They speculate that these processes somehow result in less 
identification with the self (change in perspective on the self).  
Although Hölzel et al. (2011) provide an account of mindfulness that touches 
on many of the possible mechanisms; it is neither succinct nor easy to follow. A 
major flaw is that their account of extinction relies on the induction of relaxation 
from meditation training. However, as Baer (2003) points out, meditation does not 
necessarily induce relaxation, and can in fact have the opposite effect. Moreover, the 
proposed emotion regulation technique of reappraisal necessitates judgment, which 
is in direct opposition to the non-judgmental attitude that is consistently included as 
a key component of mindfulness techniques. Emotion regulation is also more often 
cited as an outcome of mindfulness practice, as opposed to a necessary component 
required to successfully induce a state of mindfulness, or the shift in perspective on 
the self (Baer, 2003). Additionally, self-compassion, an important aspect of 
mindfulness, is not easily incorporated into the theory.  
Summary. 
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) and Hölzel et al. (2011) provide comprehensive 
accounts of how mindfulness works. Yet two publications offer elaborations on 
important points that have not been adequately addressed by the theories already 
reviewed. Baer et al. (2006) demonstrate how self-compassion might be integral to 
mindfulness, and Brown et al. (2007b) discuss the importance of the change in 
perspective that occurs in mindfulness. These are theoretically relevant as both 
researchers and theorists alike have alluded to the implications of the self in the 
process of mindfulness and thus it may serve a crucial role in how mindfulness 
works.  
Other theories of mindfulness. 
Baer et al. (2006) constructed a five-facet model to measure mindfulness that 
includes non-reactivity to inner experience; observation of experience; awareness of 
actions; describing/labelling experience with words; and nonjudging of experience. 
They found a significant positive correlation between all of these facets and self-
compassion (as measured by the Self-Compassion Scale; Neff, 2003a). Interestingly, 
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self-compassion was most strongly correlated with non-reactivity to inner 
experience. This finding is aligned with the results of Kuyken et al. (2010; outlined 
above) and provides further evidence that self-compassion is a key component of the 
outcomes of mindfulness in terms of individuals’ reactivity to their experience. A 
reduction in reactivity to internal experience may be related to the change in self-
identity that reportedly occurs in mindfulness, and from the above results, it appears 
that self-compassion may play an important role therein. 
In a recent paper that also addresses the self, Brown et al. (2007b) discuss 
what mindfulness is as a state and speculate how processes that mindfulness creates 
might lead to a series of consequent beneficial outcomes. These outcomes include 
clarity of awareness; nonconceptual, nondiscriminatory awareness; flexibility of 
awareness and attention; an empirical stance towards reality; present-oriented 
consciousness; and stability or continuity of attention and awareness. They argue 
that the above outcomes create processes of insight, exposure, non-attachment, and 
integrated functioning that could give rise to further beneficial effects of mindfulness 
practice. Recall that insight involves awareness of internal reactivity and the 
realisation that thoughts and other mental events are merely transitory experiences 
passing through the field of awareness. Exposure involves holding experience in the 
field of awareness while refraining from engaging in typical reactions to it. Non-
attachment is essentially an attitude of equanimity. The authors suggest that non-
attachment might give rise to “unconditional happiness”, that is, happiness “that is 
not contingent on circumstances” (p. 227), because it involves the lack of both 
attachment to pleasure and aversion to pain.  
Brown et al. (2007b) raise the interesting proposition that improved 
integrated functioning is the net result of the processes involved in mindfulness and 
the outcomes it produces. They suggest that improved integrated functioning may 
emerge from “a disengagement from self-concern” (p. 227), where self-concern is 
defined as “the perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, evaluations, and related feelings 
people have about themselves that tend to channel and filter contact with reality in 
self-serving ways” (p. 227). That is, through mindfulness, events in the mind lose 
their personal relevance in terms of what constitutes the self, since the person 
instead identifies with the more enduring observer perspective. 
Summary. 
Both Baer et al. (2006) and Brown et al. (2007b) raise important points with 
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regards to the self-concept, in terms of self-identity and attitude towards the self. 
Other theorists (e.g. Hölzel et al., 2011; Segal et al., 2013; S. L. Shapiro et al., 2006) 
have also identified the change in perspective and experience of the ‘self’ as 
transitional in mindfulness practice. It is important to account for the effect 
mindfulness techniques have on the self-concept, and this is addressed below.  
Core Overarching Mechanisms of Mindfulness 
Looking across the different MBIs and the descriptions of the mechanisms by 
which they work, there appear to be four common core mechanisms operating, and a 
fifth that is implicit in many theorists’ accounts but remains to be incorporated to the 
extent that the research would suggest it should be. The four common elements are 
attention (Baer, 2003; Brown et al., 2007b; Hölzel et al., 2011; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; 
Segal et al., 2013; S. L. Shapiro et al., 2006), attitude (Baer et al., 2006; Brown et al., 
2007b; Hölzel et al., 2011; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Segal et al., 2013; S. L. Shapiro et al., 
2006), intention (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; D. H. Shapiro, 1992; S. L. Shapiro et al., 2006), 
and awareness/meta-awareness (Baer, 2003; Baer et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2007b; 
S. Hayes, V. Follette, et al., 2004; Hölzel et al., 2011; Linehan, 1993a, 1993b; Neff, 
2003b; Segal et al., 2013; S. L. Shapiro et al., 2006).  
The fifth element is self-compassion, which is implicated in many accounts of 
how mindfulness works (e.g., Hölzel et al., 2011). However, self-compassion is yet to 
be included as an integral aspect of accounts of the mechanisms of mindfulness. It 
has been mostly included as a type of attitude, and is acknowledged as essential, but 
theorists have been unable to pinpoint exactly why and how. Perhaps there is 
something significant about the fact that it is an attitude towards the self. This 
possibility is explored below, with insights offered from Neff (2003a), Neff (2003b) 
and Gilbert (2009). The first four common elements are addressed first. 
Attention 
Wells and Matthews (1994) define attention as “the selection or prioritisation 
for processing of certain categories of information” (p.10), which is essentially 
focussed awareness, or selecting an element from the field of awareness and 
directing cognitive focus towards it. Attention can either be directed consciously or 
unconsciously, that is, via one’s volition, or otherwise (e.g., through underlying 
processes that are below the level of conscious awareness). In mindfulness practice, 
individuals manage their attentional resources and consciously direct attention to 
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observe any aspect of their experience within their awareness; be it the breath, 
sounds, thoughts or emotions. Each time it is noticed that attention has strayed from 
the intended subject of focus, it (attention) is re-directed back to the subject. 
Repeated practice develops this skill of attention regulation, involving purposeful 
attention-direction and re-direction.  
Research on attention illustrates the key role that directing attention plays in 
shaping our experience, that is, experience is created from what is attended to. For 
example, Watkins, Baeyens, and Read (2009) found that training participants to 
focus their attention on concrete, specific aspects of experience reduced dysphoria (a 
symptom of depression) compared to controls. Indeed, they comment that “cognitive 
models of psychopathology propose that biases in cognitive processing, such as in 
attention, memory, and interpretations, may underpin the onset and maintenance of 
emotional disorders” (Watkins et al., 2009, p. 55). In accepting this view, it makes 
sense that re-directing attention would have a significant impact on psychological 
functioning. Grabovac et al. (2011) claim that the qualities of attention-redirection 
are what makes mindfulness different from a simple attention-regulation exercise. 
Attitude 
The second mechanism is attitude. In brief, attitudes are evaluative 
tendencies, which are usually attached to an entity of some type, for example, 
actions, characteristics, state of affairs, or institutions (Albarracín, Johnson, & 
Zanna, 2005; Forgas, Cooper, & Crano, 2010). Adopting an accepting, non-
judgmental attitude towards experience is conducive to the mindfulness practice of 
observing that experience, instead of becoming consumed by the elaborative 
processing that ensues when experience is judged. For example, if a person 
experiencing low mood does not judge it, and instead accepts it as part of their 
experience, the individual is then able to directly observe what the sensation of low 
mood feels like, rather than mentally elaborating on it with judgment and imbuing it 
with meaning.  
To judge something is to create value-laden meanings associated with it. 
Thought suppression activates the very thing that the individual seeks to avoid. Thus 
judgment, suppression and avoidance are not conducive to maintaining attention 
directly on experience as it is. The remedy is an attitude of acceptance and non-
judgment.  
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Intention 
Intention involves a plan to complete a certain action, and has been likened to 
a type of belief about the behaviour that one intends to perform (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975). Intentions are important because they motivate and influence behaviour, over 
and above the attitude of the individual towards the objective of the behaviour 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Moreover, mindfulness practice is not something that 
typically spontaneously arises without the purposeful action of meaning to employ 
mindfulness techniques in ones life (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Thus, to practice 
mindfulness implies the intention to do so. 
Awareness/Meta-Awareness 
 The fourth mechanism is awareness/meta-awareness. Rapgay and Bystrisky 
(2009) define awareness as a “stable and specific state of consciousness” (p. 148). It 
is essential that people who wish to practice mindfulness have some level of 
awareness of themselves, that is, they know that they are having an experience, 
which is the ‘usual’ waking state of consciousness conceptualised in Western 
psychology (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Walsh & Vaughan, 1993). For example, an 
individual may be aware/know that it is raining, although he or she does not focus 
his or her attention on the rain. The person could focus all of his or her attention on 
the rain, and in order to do so he or she would need to have some level of awareness 
of it. Alternatively, he or she could have an image of the rain in mind that he or she 
could focus attention on, but again, without awareness that the image is there, it 
would not be possible for him or her to select it as an attentional target. Awareness of 
the target object is thus required in order for attention to be regulated. Individuals 
need to be aware of their thoughts, feelings, emotions, and so on, so that they can 1) 
navigate their attention around these contents of consciousness, and 2) have the 
capacity to carry out the tasks of mindfulness practice and develop meta-awareness.  
Every account of mindfulness includes meta-awareness. It is responsible for 
the state of mindfulness.  Teasdale et al. (2002) define meta-awareness (MA) as “a 
cognitive set in which negative thoughts/feelings are experienced as mental events, 
rather than as the self” (p.275). This is essentially the observer perspective previously 
discussed, in which a person realises that her or his awareness of experience 
necessitates that the two are separate. Teasdale et al. (2002) found that as MA 
increased the rates of depression relapse decreased in participants of both MBCT and 
cognitive therapy. They hypothesise that a central mechanism by which these two 
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treatment modalities exert their effects may be an ability to change an individuals’ 
relationship to their thoughts by promoting MA. Developing MA is important 
because it enables self-identity to become distinct from the contents of the mind, 
which has implications for psychological well-being, discussed further below.  
Self-Compassion 
Self-compassion is included either explicitly or implicitly in mindfulness 
interventions (e.g., Hölzel et al., 2011) but its impact is arguably underplayed. Self-
compassion has not only been found to be an outcome of mindfulness training in 
itself (completing an MBSR program increased self-compassion in clinicians; S. L. 
Shapiro, Astin, Bishop, & Cordova, 2005) but it has also been found to mediate the 
outcomes of mindfulness interventions such as reduced worry and fear of emotion 
(Keng, Smoski, Robins, Ekblad, & Brantley, 2012), lowered risk of depressive relapse 
in MBCT despite no change in reactivity (Kuyken et al., 2010), and increased 
happiness (Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 2011). Additionally MacBeth and Gumley 
(2012) found in their meta-analysis that self-compassion was related to reduced rates 
of anxiety, depression, and stress in both clinical and non-clinical samples. Taken 
together, the above findings indicate that self-compassion is a pertinent area to 
explore. Due to the fact that self-compassion is implicated in mindfulness, it is 
accepted that it may constitute a core mechanism. It is one, however, whose 
importance should be emphasised and made more explicit.  
In accounts of the mechanisms by which mindfulness operates, self-
compassion is often overlooked, and if included, it is mentioned as an adjunct that 
does not ‘hang’ together with the rest of the theory (Hölzel et al., 2011). The issue is 
perhaps that self-compassion, and indeed compassion itself, have been introduced to 
the psychological literature fairly recently, and are relatively poorly understood. Neff 
(2003b) offers one description: 
Compassion involves being touched by the suffering of others, opening 
one’s awareness to others’ pain and not avoiding or disconnecting from 
it, so that feelings of kindness toward others and the desire to alleviate 
their suffering emerge … It also involves offering nonjudgmental 
understanding to those who fail or do wrong, so that their actions and 
behaviors are seen in the context of shared human fallibility. Self-
compassion, therefore, involves being touched by and open to one’s 
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own suffering, not avoiding or disconnecting from it, generating the 
desire to alleviate one’s suffering and to heal oneself with kindness. 
Self-compassion also involves offering nonjudgmental understanding 
to one’s pain, inadequacies and failures, so that one’s experience is seen 
as part of the larger human experience. (pp. 86-87). 
Self-compassion essentially entails an attitude, yet it is of greater significance 
than many other attitudes because it involves an attitude towards the self, and the 
self-concept has huge psychological impact (Gilbert, 2009). Self-compassion is hence 
regarded and addressed separately to the broader attitude section above.  
Self-esteem is another attitude towards the self that affects psychological 
functioning (Neff, 2003b). However, there is a fundamental difference between these 
two attitudes towards the self. Self-esteem is derived from performance-based 
judgments of oneself, usually in comparison with others. Criticism and evaluation 
create feelings of disconnection that are detrimental to psychological well-being 
(Gilbert, 2009). On the other hand, self-compassion is only possible where self 
judgment is suspended and replaced with kindness and understanding (Neff, 
2003b). Self-compassion thus generates positive feelings towards the self that are 
not reliant on external stimuli, strategies that create feelings of disconnection, or 
unbalanced or biased views of the self (all of which contribute to psychological 
suffering; see Neff, 2003b).  
Psychopathology often arises from unrealistic cognitions, and psychotherapy 
aims to help clients to view reality in a more balanced and realistic light (S. Hayes, 
Follette, et al., 2004). However, Neff (2003a) points out that both high and low self-
esteem do not necessarily foster a realistic balanced view of reality. Neff (2003a) 
suggests that self-compassion, on the other hand, side-steps the problem of 
evaluation-based representations of reality, and is instead based on the assumptions 
that there is a common human experience of suffering, and that all people have equal 
intrinsic value. Neff (2003a) explains that these assumptions create a connectedness 
that is based on an attitude of kindness and affection, which in turn foster positive 
affect towards both the self and others, since others are no longer a threat to the self 
and instead are seen as allies in life.  
Gilbert (2009) addresses the importance of the emergent property of the ‘self’ 
and psychological well-being. He notes that the sense of self can become problematic 
when experience is critically evaluated in terms of the implications that it has for this 
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sense of self, and further claims that self-compassion provides a remedy for the 
conundrum of being self-aware and thus being able to have an attitude towards 
oneself.  
Roberts and Monroe (1994) developed a multi-dimensional model of self-
esteem variability (SEV; self-esteem level changes). This model is based on their 
previous finding that SEV, as opposed to self-esteem level itself, predicted the onset 
of depressive symptoms (Roberts & Monroe, 1992). They hypothesised four 
predictors of SEV. These were deriving self-esteem from limited sources (limited 
sources of self-esteem), adopting negative generalisations (e.g. generalizing one 
event, such as a failure, to all other events), possessing a defectiveness schema about 
the self, and negative life events. Further research has provided support for this 
model (Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994; Kernis et al., 1998). A. M. Hayes, Harris, 
and Carver (2004) specifically tested the four hypothesised predictors of SEV in 
participants who either had a history of depression or no history, and found that 
increased severity of past depression symptoms was associated with increases in all 
four predictors. Additionally, negative life events predicted SEV, and these events 
interacted with defectiveness schemas and generalization to predict SEV as well. 
Increased negative generalization was a direct predictor of increases in SEV.  
Taken together, the findings that self-esteem is both a predictor of 
psychopathology and can easily become problematic on its own, and that variability 
therein is associated with depression, suggest that replacing self-judgment and 
comparison with others with a self-attitude that does not rely on evaluations of 
performance but instead on more positive components of kindness, affection, and 
understanding, may improve psychological outcomes. The adoption and activation of 
an alternative attitude towards the self may be part of the function that self-
compassion plays in mindfulness (Neff, 2003b). For example, comparisons with 
others (used in self-esteem evaluations) contribute to feelings of isolation and 
disconnectedness (which are related to depression and other maladaptive states), 
whereas recognizing one’s experience as common to humanity in self-compassion 
contributes to well-being (Neff, 2003b).  
Self-esteem is derived from placing a disproportionate amount of value on the 
implications of one’s experience for one’s sense of self-worth (Neff, 2003a), which, as 
already discussed, encompasses identifying with experience, the cessation of which 
leads to improved self-regulation and psychological functioning (Brown & Ryan, 
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2003). Thus self-compassion necessitates the cessation of comparative and 
judgmental processing, and in this way is conducive to the practice of mindfulness 
techniques. The observer perspective is also applied in self-compassion, in that 
feelings of self-compassion are not identified with. They too are known and 
recognized as mental events (Neff, 2003b).  
Neff (2003b) claims that directing kindness towards oneself creates an 
‘emotionally safe’ environment in which to explore one’s experience and difficulties 
therein, which she argues is conducive to mindfulness practice, since exploring 
experience is integral to the techniques involved. Gilbert (2009) proposes one 
account of how self-compassion operates to produce positive outcomes associated 
with mindfulness, which is linked to the emotionally safe account offered by Neff. 
Gilbert (2009) suggests that there are three types of affect regulation functions that 
form interacting, albeit separate, systems. These are a threat and self-protection 
system, incentive and resource-seeking system, and a soothing and contentment 
system.  
The function of the threat and self-protection system is to “pick up on threats 
quickly and then give us bursts of feeling” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 23) that motivate us to 
act in self-protecting ways (much like the ‘driven-doing mode’ outlined by Segal et 
al., 2013). The incentive and resource-seeking system functions to “give us positive 
feelings that … motivate … us to seek out resources that we … need to survive and 
prosper” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 23; parallels the ‘doing-mode’ proposed by Segal et al., 
2013). Finally, the soothing and contentment system restores a person’s emotional 
balance by recognizing that they have everything they need (similar to the notion of 
‘being mode’ from Segal et al., 2013), which gives rise to contentment, that is, “not 
striving or wanting anything” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 24). Gilbert (2009) suggests that 
when the two former systems are not balanced and regulated by activation of the 
latter system, people become “stressed and distressed” (p. 26). Gilbert (2009) argues 
that the ‘soothing and contentment’ system is activated by kindness and affection, 
and that it is “vital for our well-being” (p. 25). Given this line of reasoning, it makes 
sense that self-compassion would give rise to the positive outcomes associated with 
mindfulness. That is, if self-compassion is what activates an affect-regulation system 
that is associated with satisfaction with the way things are, then it would be 
conducive and perhaps essential to fostering an attitude of acceptance towards 
experience that is purportedly essential in a mindfulness state.  
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Chapter Conclusion 
The common elements listed above are essentially descriptive accounts of 
mechanisms involved in how mindfulness practice works, and have served as a 
starting point in theories that attempt to explain this. Although the theories provide 
useful descriptions of how mindfulness operates, they do not clearly specify how the 
mechanisms interact or how they operate psychologically to create a state of 
mindfulness, or how this state results in symptom reduction, or many of the other 
outcomes of mindfulness practice. Essentially they lack a model of the fundamental 
psychological changes that take place through mindfulness practice. With best 
practice in mind, it is timely that theories begin to attempt to identify the underlying 
mechanisms that underpin mindfulness practice. The following chapter proposes one 
such possible model of psychological functioning and offers an explanation for how 
mindfulness may operate therein. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE DECONTEXTUALISING MODEL OF MINDFULNESS 
Existing theories about the mechanisms by which mindfulness works are 
underdeveloped in that they provide a list of interacting components, but lack an 
explanation for the underlying psychological mechanisms that operate to produce the 
outcomes of mindfulness practice. To put it simply, why does paying attention to and 
being aware of the present moment change a person’s relationship to their 
experience? How does this fundamental change happen? What is the role of 
intention, attitude, and self-compassion, and why are they considered essential in 
practicing mindfulness (e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1990)? 
The Decontextualising Model of Mindfulness 
The decontextualising model of mindfulness (DMM) proposed here 
contributes one interpretation of how attention regulation and levels of intentional 
awareness operate to produce a fundamental change in an individual’s information 
processing style, which results in the experiential state of mindfulness and the 
observed outcomes. Information processing concerns the way events in the mind are 
construed, interpreted, and managed. For example, in depression there is a negative-
bias, whereby information tends to be processed in a negative light, and attention 
favours negative events. Mental events are representations as they refer to some 
aspect of the self or the world, and as such, have conceptual content, such as 
thoughts, feelings, sensations and emotions. The DMM also helps to explain the role 
of intention and attitudes in mindfulness practice. 
The DMM is based on Powers’ (1973) model of self-regulation, which provides 
a useful framework for understanding the way attention, information processing, and 
action are causally related. Powers’ model is an elaboration of, and alternative to, 
pure behaviourist models, as it conceptualises the organism as an active participant 
in its responses to the environment. Recent theorists such as Carver and Scheier 
(1998) have used Powers’ model to develop their own theories of self-regulation. 
Powers argued that behaviour is guided by hierarchically organised goals, which are 
connected and modified via feedback control.  
Feedback loops are one of two fundamental components of Powers’ (1973) 
original model (the other being their hierarchical organisation – outlined below). 
According to Carver and Scheier (1998) in their elaboration of the Powers model, 
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“feedback processes involve the control or regulation of certain values within a 
system” (p.10) via four interacting components. Feedback loops include an input, a 
reference value, a comparator, and an output.  In its original conceptualisation, 
feedback processes were part of the fundamental “science of communication and 
control” (Carver & Scheier, 1998, p.10). However, for the purposes of the current 
explanation, behavioural examples will be used.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Depiction of a feedback loop, adapted from Carver and Scheier (1998).  
In this model (see Figure 1) the comparator compares the input with the 
reference value, and if necessary, adjusts output to influence the external impact and 
subsequent input so that it (the input) is more congruent with the reference value. 
‘Input’ is the information entering the system from the external environment (e.g. 
perception of a spouse’s unhappy look). ‘Reference values’ are likened to goals (e.g. 
‘keep my spouse happy’), and the ‘comparator’ compares the input with the reference 
value. It then either discerns that the two are different or that they are not. The result 
is the output function, which is anything that the system does to have an impact on 
its environment. If the comparator found a difference between the reference value 
and the input (e.g. the goal is to ‘keep my spouse happy’, but the information from 
the input is that ‘my spouse is not happy’), the output would be altered accordingly, 
whereby an attempt to manipulate input to match the reference value would occur 
(e.g. ‘console my spouse’). If no difference is found (e.g. the goal is to ‘keep my 
spouse happy’, and the information from the input is that ‘my spouse appears 
happy’) the output remains the same (which may be no action at all). There may also 
be a secondary system that operates to alter the reference value to be more like the 
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input (e.g. the spouse remains unhappy regardless of what the individual does, so the 
reference value is altered to accommodate this and reduce stress on the system). 
The notion of hierarchicality has been incorporated into theories covering a 
range of behavioural phenomena (see Carver & Scheier, 1998). This concept refers to 
hierarchically organised levels of abstraction, which is a continuum ranging from 
concrete to abstract conceptualisations. The abstract level involves general 
superordinate concepts that convey abstract meaning, such as the goal to be a good 
neighbour. The concrete level constitutes specific subordinate concepts that convey 
the ‘how’ of an action or event, for example, shovelling snow off the neighbour’s 
driveway in the service of the goal of being a good neighbour (Watkins et al., 2009). 
Note that in the two examples above, the same action may be completed but 
conceptualised in either more abstract or more concrete terms (discussed further 
below). In Powers’ (1973) original model, feedback control loops are organised from 
concrete to abstract to provide a system for the self-regulation of behaviour.  
In Powers (1973) model, the highest level of abstraction of a goal is a system 
concept, which are values such as the ‘ideal self’. The system concept provides 
principle control to the next level of abstraction. That is, the output of the system 
concept provides a guiding principle as a starting point on how to achieve behaviour 
that conforms to that value. The proceeding feedback loops are programs that 
determine increasingly concrete guides for the action that is the manifestation of the 
system value and guiding principle. The output of each level of abstraction provides a 
reference value for the next, more concrete level down, and in this way behaviour is 
regulated in relation to goals and ultimately higher-order values. For example, one 
way to ‘be’ the ideal self is to ‘be a good neighbour’, and to be a good neighbour is to 
‘shovel snow off the neighbour’s driveway’, and to do this is to ‘pick up a shovel and 
move the snow’, which translates to concrete muscle movements and subsequent 
action. Each of these feedback processes manages their respective discrepancies 
simultaneously, each at their appropriate individual level of abstraction (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998). The structure of the system is such that the system concept is 
translated into increasingly concrete goals until it terminates as the execution of an 
appropriate action, which fulfils the goals of each feedback loop (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. A depiction of Powers' (1973) model of hierarchically organised feedback 
loops (adapted from Carver and Scheier (1998)). C is the comparator and RV is the 
reference value. The output of each comparator is the reference value for the next 
comparator, until the final feedback loop, which terminates in action. 
For example, a self-maintaining feedback loop in depression could include ‘failure’ as 
the system concept, with the principle of ‘avoid failure’, and the reference values of 
‘do not try’ (reasoned by the inevitability of failure), followed by ‘stay in bed’ at the 
next most concrete level, which would result in the output behaviour of lying down 
and not moving (i.e., staying in bed). The dysphoric mood that may have initially 
activated this system concept in the first place is then maintained by the lack of 
opportunity for an activity or the environment to disrupt its presence. Thus, the 
input generated from the behaviour of staying in bed is dysphoric mood, which 
effectively both activates and then maintains the hierarchical feedback loop system 
(this is a highly simplified version of possible depressive feedback patterns and is 
employed for illustrative purposes only).  
A person’s awareness of, and reflection on, mental events can also be 
conceptualised using Powers’ (1973) model. Vallacher and Wegner’s (1985) action 
identification theory, which is partially derived from Powers’ (1973) original theory, 
describes how people conceptualise their own actions. According to Vallacher and 
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Wegner (1985) people mentally conceptualise their actions at various levels of 
abstraction. For example, the same action can either be subjectively thought of as the 
abstract concept of ‘helping a neighbour’ or the more concrete description of ‘moving 
snow off a driveway’ (and indeed even more concrete as ‘contracting muscles in a 
certain sequence’). This is essentially a hierarchically linked ladder of meaning or 
abstraction. Each level of abstraction captures a unique perspective on the action and 
its associated information processing. That is, thoughts about the action are either 
abstract and elaborate, or more concrete and grounded in the mechanics and reality 
of the action in the time and space within which it occurs.  
A novel action is often thought about in concrete terms (Vallacher & Wegner, 
1985). As an action is practiced more, it becomes more ‘fluid’ (less effortful). As it 
becomes more fluid, a process termed emergence occurs whereby the person 
executing the action comes to think of it in more abstract terms (Carver & Scheier, 
1998). The more abstract the conceptualisation, the more value-laden and removed 
from the actual, concrete experience it becomes. The concept of emergence is useful 
in explaining how cognitive errors develop and are maintained. For example, a 
person with depression tends to think about specific events in a negative way, and as 
this becomes more fluent, emergence occurs and her or his thinking becomes more 
abstract. This leads to overgeneralisation, which is a cognitive error common to 
people with depression, whereby general blanket statements are applied to all 
aspects of experience (e.g., ‘I am a failure’). A bias towards thinking about events in 
which one failed leads to the emergence of the abstract concept that the individual is 
a failure.  
The level at which actions are thought about determines their meaning and 
thus influences subsequent behaviour. Elaboration on experience takes it beyond 
face value and may generate problematic cognitive errors. Take for example 
obsessions and compulsions. A thought (the obsession) is taken to mean that the 
person actually wants to complete the thought as an action.  For example, a mother 
has a fleeting thought of drowning her baby in the bathtub and interprets this 
thought as meaning she must actually want to drown her baby (although she does 
not feel a desire to do so). She believes that if she completes a compulsion, such as 
washing her hands 10 times, the thought will be ‘cancelled out’ and this brings her 
back to neutrality by reducing the distress associated with the meaning of her 
thought. This thought-feeling-action cycle is an extremely value-laden process. 
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Compare this to concrete conceptualisations of the same scenario – a thought is 
merely a passing image in the mind that when extracted from its meaning-rich 
context, loses its typical meaning, and washing hands has no value-based 
repercussions whatsoever. To put it differently, actions are partially influenced by the 
abstract meaning that is placed on specific situations and internal events. The level of 
abstraction at which attention is focussed is therefore psychologically significant, 
because it will impact on the meaning that is derived from experience and thus 
subsequent behaviour. The focus of attention during the action in a sense determines 
exactly what type of action it is at that time.  
Essentially, the basis of the DMM is formed by the supposition that self-
regulation is guided by hierarchically linked feedback loops, and that this also 
provides a framework for thoughts to occur in, that is, a way for people to think 
about their experience. Decontextualising mental events (a) disengages maladaptive 
hierarchical systems and the associated levels of actions and then (b) provides ‘room’ 
for creating more adaptive or competing system concepts (e.g. compassion) that lead 
to action options that are more likely to result in fulfilling outcomes.   
The DMM in Mindfulness 
Attention and Awareness 
In mindfulness, the key technique is directing attention away from a more 
abstract focus of awareness to concrete events occurring in the here and now, 
including observing an abstract thought as an isolated event. Hence, the person 
practicing mindfulness escapes from, or avoids, engaging a more elaborated and 
conscious stream of thinking about experience. This is the first of two sets of 
processes in mindfulness. For example, when practicing mindfulness, rather than 
attending to abstract ruminative thoughts (going over and over negative events and 
their meaning), a person with depression redirects his or her attention to the 
sensation of breathing. Alternatively, she or he may redirect her or his attention to 
observing the occurrence of a ruminative thought as an isolated event.  
According to the DMM, by narrowing the focus of attention to the most 
concrete level of meaning possible – located within a specific time and place (e.g. 
focusing attention on the sensation of breathing right now, or a thought occurring in 
isolation, right now) – events in the mind are effectively decontextualized (hence the 
name of the model). That is, events in the mind are removed from their typical web 
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of associations and meanings, and exposed for what they really are – merely separate 
and transitory occurrences within the field of awareness, that are not necessarily true 
or false or important. When attention is not consumed by the contents of a 
hierarchical system but is rather focussed on the presence of the hierarchical system 
itself and therefore not engaged in cognitive elaborations, the link between mental 
events and the associated cognitive elaboration is weakened and the hierarchical 
system within which mental events are entrenched is deactivated, while awareness of 
what is occurring at the most concrete experiential level, without evaluation, is 
strengthened. Thus, the system is still present, but it is not experienced as a value-
laden conceptually linked web, and instead as impulses occurring in each isolated 
moment. This process is negatively reinforcing because it enables people to 
terminate the dysfunctional stream of negative thoughts and feelings, and thus 
increases the likelihood that they will practice this strategy in future. 
Self-evaluative beliefs and attitudes require generalisations beyond a specific 
time and place to objects such as a continuing self or persisting states of affairs, 
extending into the past or future. However from a mindfulness perspective, all that 
really exists is the current focus of attention: a particular element of experience. 
When events in the mind are decontextualised, they ultimately have no necessary 
self-evaluative implications: thoughts, feelings, and emotions are specific events 
occurring here and now at a particular time and place. Moreover, the self-concept 
itself is decontextualized because there has been a shift from an elaborative, rich 
cluster of associations about the person, his or her life and circumstances, to a 
relatively ‘thin’ layer of associations relating to sensations, or rudimentary aspects of 
experience, at a unique moment in time (i.e., the ‘present’).  
Following decontextualisation of mental events including those related to the 
self-concept, identity no longer resides with the contents of consciousness, but 
instead with that which is conscious of them – the observer. This meta-awareness 
exists outside of the hierarchical systems, and is therefore not explained by them. 
Indeed, there are an abundance of theories about consciousness, and the DMM 
simply assumes that it exists and is responsible for wilful direction of attention.  
Cognitive ‘space’ is created when certain elaborate systems are deactivated 
since the attentional resources that these were using become available for other 
tasks. The concept of mental space has been used before by Scheff (1981) who 
describes that the optimal distance to have from one’s experience in order to deal 
 37 
with it effectively is when “one is simultaneously and equally a participant and an 
observer” (p. 46). This is exactly what practicing mindfulness does – it allows a 
person to at once be both the observer of their experience while simultaneously 
directly experiencing their experience, working with both in equal parts. 
Self-Compassion 
The cognitive space created through the use of mindfulness techniques may be 
necessary in order to introduce self-compassion; the second set of processes integral 
to mindfulness (Neff, 2003b). According to the DMM, self-compassion forms a 
system concept with related principles and reference values. However, since it is 
occurring within the context of a mindful state, it is not identified as the self-concept 
either, which instead remains as the observer perspective.  
Hierarchically organised levels of abstraction may explain how self-
compassion (along with other positive structures) is established psychologically. 
‘Self-compassion’ provides the system concept, from which arise at least three 
principles outlined by Neff (2003a): kindness towards oneself; recognition of the 
commonality of human experience; and acceptance and allowance of experience. 
Each of these clusters of self-compassion then filter down into increasingly concrete 
reference values that eventuate in self-compassionate behaviour, as well as elaborate 
systems for thinking about the self that are compassionate. This is positively 
reinforcing because it results in constructive self-evaluative observations and 
feelings, which in turn increases the use of techniques such as self-compassion, and 
activates and therefore strengthens the systems to which it is associated.  
Perhaps one way in which self-compassion achieves positive psychological 
outcomes is through the medium of the ‘self’. Recall that the self-concept has high 
implications for psychological wellbeing. It seems that perhaps self-compassion 
results in profound psychological outcomes because it involves purposefully creating 
positive systems related to the self that do not require judgment and comparison but 
instead positively valenced qualities such as kindness and understanding.  
Intention and Attitude 
Powers (1973) control hierarchy model offers one explanation for how 
intention and attitude operate as mechanisms conducive, and arguably essential, for 
mindfulness practice (e.g., S. L. Shapiro et al., 2006). Formulating an intention 
creates a system concept that provides the purpose for practicing mindfulness, and 
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thus sets up a goal system hierarchy that results in the behaviour of practicing 
mindfulness. Having a certain non-judgmental self-compassionate attitude towards 
any aspect of experience that arises during mindfulness practice also creates system 
concepts that produce acceptance, understanding and non-reactivity in the face of 
thoughts, feelings, and sensations, which is crucial to the successful practice of 
mindfulness. When activated, these systems influence the self-regulation of 
behaviour as well as ways of thinking about oneself and experience. They override 
many of the systems that hold identity within the confines of mental events, and thus 
aid in the realisation that mental events are separate from the observer of them.  
Systems are created and activated when elaborate hierarchical systems are 
created and strengthened by focussing on them and mentally rehearsing the system 
concepts and principles guiding behaviour. This may be what happens when 
intention and attitude towards mindfulness practice are formulated, and in this way 
a person can at once disengage from unhelpful psychological patterns and create 
helpful ones. This demonstrates the flexibility of the DMM; it does not assume that 
someone always has higher-level goals, but that they can learn to form them as a 
consequence of experience, which leads to the development of new schemas. 
The DMM in Depression 
In Beck’s (1976) cognitive theory of depression, there are three major 
constructs: underlying beliefs; the cognitive triad; and information processing. The 
cognitive triad is comprised of the self, the world, and the future. In depression, all 
three are viewed negatively. Underlying beliefs are hypothesised to develop from 
early experience and encompass rules for interpreting experience, which arise as 
automatic thoughts. An example of a problematic underlying belief that may lead to 
depression is, “I am only worth anything if I am successful”. When strictly adhered 
to, this belief may give rise to the thought “I am worthless” following perceived 
failure. Finally, information processing, as already outlined above, involves the way 
experience or information entering awareness is interpreted or processed.  
In depression, information processing becomes distorted such that there is a 
preoccupation with rumination on negative thoughts (negative bias), single negative 
events are generalised to provide a view of all other events (overgeneralisation) and 
positive events are attributed to external unstable factors, or seen as ‘one-off’s’ 
(abstraction). Avoidance and suppression of negative thoughts paradoxically has the 
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opposite effect and the frequency of the very thoughts that the person sought to 
diminish actually increases. This preoccupation with thoughts-about and 
interpretations-of experience means that attention is given entirely to negative 
thoughts and evaluations.  
Attention  
From a mindfulness perspective, those suffering from depression need to 
learn to re-direct their attention away from the abstract negative elaboration about 
their experience, and towards concrete experience itself, as it occurs in a specific 
time and place, that is, here and now. According to the DMM, attending to the 
presence of mental events entrenched in hierarchical systems, and not to their 
content, decontextualises mental events and thereby both deactivates the 
hierarchical processes involved therein and weakens the elaborate links between 
mental events. In mindfulness, problematic cognitions as well as maladaptive 
cognitive styles (e.g., rumination) that are characteristic in depression are 
decontextualised. The decontextualising process prevents the unfolding of a cascade 
of depressive thoughts and rumination, which is hypothesised to prevent further 
negative, elaborative information processing. 
Intention 
According to the DMM perspective, forming intentions creates system 
hierarchies in relation to mindfulness practice, experience, and the self, and since 
these systems are implicated in the self-regulation of behaviour, they are conducive 
to practice.  
Attitude and Awareness/Meta-Awareness 
Attitudes of acceptance and non-judgment are cultivated in mindfulness 
practice. According to the DMM perspective, attitudes such as these create an 
evaluative hierarchical system that terminates in accepting and non-judgmental 
behaviour (even if the behaviour is purely cognitive). Activating these hierarchical 
systems, via practicing mindfulness and periodically reminding oneself or being 
reminded to accept and not judge one’s experience, strengthens them and aids 
mindfulness practice. Attitudes, which are created in essentially the same way as 
depressive ruminative loops, are then purposefully selected to guide and regulate 
behaviour, rather than ruminative systems and belief systems regarding the efficacy 
of ruminative thinking. The difference is not only that these new attitude systems are 
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positively valenced, but also perhaps more importantly, that they aid in directing 
awareness to observe the presence of the contents of consciousness and to not 
engage with the contents themselves, which gives rise to identification with meta-
awareness. 
Self-Compassion 
Identifying with the observer perspective creates cognitive ‘space’, which 
according to the DMM perspective is utilised to introduce hierarchically linked self-
compassion systems. This provides an attitude towards the self and one’s experience 
that is understanding and affectionate. In effect, one is both operating from an 
observer perspective and generating feelings of self-compassion towards all aspects 
of this new self-identity and its experience. In other words, as a hierarchical system, 
self-compassion guides accepting, kind and understanding attitudes towards the self, 
including the experience that the self is having, and therefore aids further 
mindfulness practice and strengthening of a mindfulness state. According to the 
DMM self-compassion provides an alternative to negative self-concepts and 
evaluations and the associated negative affect common in depression. 
Chapter Conclusion 
The DMM integrates Powers’ (1973) model and Vallacher and Wegner’s (1985) 
model to illustrate one possible explanation for how the mind is constructed 
psychologically and how mindfulness techniques might operate therein to produce a 
state of mindfulness. The DMM explains how attention is directed around 
hierarchically linked feedback loops to expand awareness to meta-awareness where 
the contents of the mind cease to constitute the self. The DMM also explains how 
attention to certain attitudes and intentions creates hierarchically linked feedback 
loops that provide contents of the mind that are conducive to mindfulness practice. 
Additionally, the DMM addresses the role of self-compassion, and explains that it 
may operate as a special kind of hierarchical system that guides the attitude towards 
the self and in that way improves psychological well-being, which the self-concept 
has high implications for. The DMM has also been applied to depression to 
demonstrate its pliability from pure theory to applications within psychopathology. 
However, as with any theory, it is important to critically evaluate the DMM on 
a number of levels. In the following chapter, the DMM is evaluated against other 
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models of mindfulness, other psychotherapies, mechanisms of change in 
psychotherapy, and finally, for its adequacy as a theory. 
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CHAPTER 4 – EVALUATING THE DMM 
The DMM and Mindfulness Interventions 
To test the utility of the DMM as a theory it must be evaluated in terms of its 
ability to explain phenomena proposed in accounts of how mindfulness works. This 
is addressed here in relation to the accounts covered in chapter two.  
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction 
In his account of how mindfulness operates in the Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction (MBSR) program, Kabat-Zinn (1982) states that mental events lose their 
influence over an individual “simply by being observed” (p. 35). In the DMM, 
directing attention to events in the mind as isolated events unconnected to any 
meaning explains how simple observation operates to remove the impact of internal 
events. That is, because mental events are decontextualized when observed, they no 
longer elicit associated value-laden elaboration, and thus “lose considerable power 
and urgency” (p. 35). It makes sense then, that as Kabat-Zinn (1982) states, this 
creates exposure because the individual is exposed to the event without reacting to it 
in the usual way, since it is decontextualised. Desensitisation follows because the 
hierarchical system previously related to the event is deactivated and thus the 
individual habituates to its presence as a non-threatening phenomenon.  
In order to decontextualise events in the mind, the individual must direct 
attention to them and recognise that since they are observing the event, they must be 
operating from an awareness that is separate from it. This explains Kabat-Zinn’s 
(1982) claim; that through observing experience, the individual learns that they are 
separate from their experience.  
Kabat-Zinn’s (1982) conjecture that accepting and ‘allowing’ experience leads 
to improved coping skills can be linked back to the explanation offered by the DMM, 
in which attitudes are established as hierarchical systems that provide self-regulation 
strategies. Acceptance and allowance can be used to tolerate any aspect of experience 
that may arise, and allow it to arise and pass away, rather than prolonging it through 
suppression or clinging.  
The skill of decontextualising itself can also be seen as a coping skill. 
Decontextualising thoughts, emotions, and feelings detaches them from their typical 
web of meaning and weakens their power to influence subsequent reactions and 
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actions (since they are no longer associated with these further elaborations). This is 
in line with Kabat-Zinn’s reasoning that internal reactivity leads to suffering, and 
thus it follows that the removal of reactivity will reduce suffering.  
The ‘cognitive space’ created by deactivation of the hierarchical systems allows 
for the clarity of perception that Kabat-Zinn refers to. In this space, the research 
shows that people are also able to self-regulate and manage their emotions without 
deferring to habitual, dysfunctional ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003). Instead, people are able to utilise the cognitive space to do the mental 
work of considering that experience can inform, rather than control, action. 
According to the DMM, mental events no longer control action because they have 
been decontextualised and are thus no longer meaningful in the way that they used to 
be. That is, emotions, thoughts, and sensations do not have the same associations 
that they used to, and if they do, these are not taken as determinants of subsequent 
behaviour.  
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy 
The DMM is also aligned with Segal et al.’s (2013) model of depression for 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), which states that repeated rehearsal 
of ruminative loops strengthens the depressive pathway, thus increasing the 
likelihood of relapse following a trigger. In the DMM, increases in activation of the 
hierarchical system correspond to strengthening of the elaborate associations 
therein, and thus with each depressive episode, the related hierarchical systems are 
strengthened, and relapse likelihood increases.  
The DMM explains the finding that mood dysphoria may be enough to trigger 
relapse after a person has been depressed twice (Ingram et al., 2011). In terms of 
input, the original pathway will usually be triggered by an external negative event, 
which the individual interprets in a certain way, and this creates dysphoria. Given 
that the triggering event itself inevitably passes, the associated dysphoria becomes 
the input that keeps the system active. MBCT may therefore be effective because 
along with related depressive thoughts and feelings, dysphoria is decontextualized, 
and thus removed from the hierarchical system. It is experienced as an isolated event 
that does not preclude the onset of depressive symptoms (since as an isolated event, 
it is no longer associated with these). The result is the exit from the ‘ruminative loop’. 
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Segal et al. (2013) propose that higher-level belief systems may drive the use 
of rumination. According to the DMM, when rumination is decontextualized, the 
belief that drives it is also deactivated, which further aids in the cessation of 
rumination.  
The DMM also offers a possible mechanism underlying the explanation 
offered by Teasdale et al. (2000) for their finding that for people previously 
depressed three times or more, MBCT was significantly more efficacious than 
treatment as usual (TAU), but that it was equal to TAU for participants who had been 
previously depressed only twice. Recall that the authors explain this finding with the 
rationale that both the pattern of depressive thinking was stronger in those 
depressed three times, and was also more likely to be triggered by an internal event. 
It may be that decontextualizing is more useful when the hierarchical system is 
stronger and thus harder to weaken using TAU, which involves the use of cognitive 
techniques such as introducing ‘more realistic’ thoughts to replace hierarchical 
systems.  
 The DMM also provides an explanation for the underpinnings of the ‘modes of 
mind’ that Segal et al. (2013) refer to, and their rationale that MBCT teaches 
participants to exit one mode and enter another. Recall that the ‘doing’ mode is 
characterised by searching for discrepancies between ‘ideal’ and ‘actual’ experience 
and seeking to reduce any discrepancies found. Meanwhile, the ‘driven-doing’ mode 
occurs when the function of the doing mode is applied to the internal world and a 
person’s self-concept. From the perspective of the DMM, the modes can be thought 
of as a cluster of hierarchically linked levels of abstraction pertaining to an overall 
system concept. These are activated by the concepts at each level themselves, and 
regulated through the use of the comparators (that compare input with the reference 
value).  
For example, my ‘ideal self’ is the system concept, and a related principle is 
that of being organised. If my bed is unmade, I can reduce the discrepancy found by 
the comparator between the unmade bed and my conceptualisation of myself as 
organised by making the bed. If I forgot a friend’s birthday, only to be reminded of it 
the next day, the comparator would detect a discrepancy between the principle to be 
organised and my reality; that I forgot a friend’s birthday. In the ‘driven-doing’ 
mode, the comparator would activate an elaborate hierarchical system in relation to 
thoughts about my self and my failure to actualise my ideal self, and the implications 
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this has for my sense of self. The ‘solution’, therefore, is to think of myself as a 
failure. Activating the self-concept of ‘I am a failure’ involves the activation of further 
hierarchical elaborative systems involving thinking about my experience and myself. 
The discrepancy may be resolved, but at a high cost – the adoption of the concept of 
myself as a failure, and the subsequent negative outcomes. Additionally, the original 
discrepancy with my ideal self-concept has not been resolved, and until the system 
manages to do so, it will continue to activate the elaborate hierarchical systems 
relating to my self as a failure. It becomes clear that these linked systems form an 
entire pattern of thinking and processing information that all fit under the umbrella 
of ‘driven-doing’ mode. 
 The third and final mode formulated by Segal et al. (2013) is the ‘being’ mode, 
which is essentially contentment with the way things are. According to the DMM, the 
key difference is that the being mode does not involve the activation of hierarchical 
systems that pertain to comparisons between how things are and how they ‘should’ 
be. What remains is the present moment, and acceptance of it as it is, since there are 
no means-end gains to be made. Exiting the ‘driven-doing’ mode and activating the 
‘being’ mode can be conceptualised as the outcome of decontextualising hierarchical 
systems. Thus, problematic processing is not utilised because there is no need to 
place great importance on any event. Goals may still guide behaviour, but the focus is 
not on the elaborations, and is instead on isolated events occurring in the here and 
now. Additionally, as mentioned above in relation to MBSR, decontextualizing events 
in the mind reveals the self as the observer of these events and not the events 
themselves, which no longer have the importance for the sense of self that they used 
to. When concepts in the mind and experience do not have implications for the self, 
‘driven-doing’ mode becomes void, since by definition it involves interpreting 
experience as relevant to the self.  
ACT and Relational Frame Theory 
 The DMM is also compatible with S. Hayes et al. (2001) Relational Frame 
Theory (RFT). RFT provides a framework for understanding human language and 
higher cognition. It is possible that RFT is comprised of an underlying system of 
hierarchically organised systems that are interconnected and interrelated. As a 
foundation for ACT, RFT provides a framework for understanding the inflexibility of 
thinking that can arise. Cognitive inflexibility may be related to the hierarchical 
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systems of the DMM in that the more a system is activated, the stronger it gets. The 
stronger the system, the more inflexible and resistant to change and difficult to exit it 
becomes. Given this line of reasoning it makes sense that decontextualizing the 
network would enable more cognitive flexibility. That is, thoughts lose their gravity 
and weight, and therefore are not held as rigidly, which frees up flexibility in the 
sense that alternative thoughts do not threaten the sense of self – since they are not 
‘me’. Additionally, cognitive space is created in which to introduce new systems. 
Moreover, when the person is not caught up in thinking-about experience, they are 
better equipped to respond to each unique experience as it arises in each new 
moment. 
  Acceptance is a cornerstone of ACT, and in terms of the DMM, constitutes 
another hierarchical system that is introduced to regulate behaviour. It also may 
activate hierarchical networks that are related to contentment, since this is the 
opposite of craving and aversion, and is created by adopting attitudes that do not 
require discrepancy reduction. When thoughts are decontextualised it is apparent 
that they do not necessarily have any implications for the self or reality. Moreover, 
the skill of decontextualizing empowers individuals to be able to exit old reaction 
patterns, and therefore is a coping skill in itself.  
The DMM and Theories of Mindfulness 
S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) 
 The DMM presents one interpretation for how the three types of processes 
proposed by S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) have their effect. As already addressed above, 
in the DMM intention and attitude are essentially comprised of hierarchical levels of 
abstraction that guide behaviour. According to the DMM, attention, the third factor, 
operates to decontextualize events in the mind. When events in the mind are 
decontextualized they lose their implications for the self (‘I’ and ‘me’), which leads to 
the shift in perspective (‘reperceiving’) that S. L. Shapiro et al. (2006) propose, 
because one realises that awareness is separate from the contents of the mind.  
 Shapiro et al. (2006) argue reperceiving, or disidentifying from the contents of 
consciousness, enables cognitive, emotional and behavioural flexibility. In the DMM, 
this means that new system concepts and related hierarchical systems involving 
alternative cognitive, emotional, and behavioural response options can be created 
and practiced without threatening the value or status of the self. 
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 Shapiro et al. (2006) suggest that values clarification is an outcome that 
follows reperceiving. This makes sense with the DMM, because decontextualizing 
removes thoughts, including values, from their web of associated meaning, and 
therefore enables examination of what guides behaviour, and the ability to make 
informed, rather than reflexive, choices in regards to the values to uphold and those 
to discard.  
 The final two outcomes Shapiro et al. (2006) put forth are self-regulation and 
exposure, both of which have been covered in relation to the DMM above.  
Hölzel et al. (2011) 
 The DMM possibly also underpins the mechanisms Hölzel et al. (2011) 
describe. Sustained attention to the body is key in their theory, and in terms of the 
DMM, directing attention to the body decontextualises events in the mind by 
maintaining focus on the most concrete aspect of experience available, which is 
occurring in the body in the present moment. Thus, elaborate rehearsal of 
hierarchical systems is disrupted. The DMM framework has already been applied to 
the construction of attitudes and the processes of exposure and extinction in 
mindfulness that Hölzel et al. (2011) suggest in their theory.  
 Hölzel et al. (2011) propose that a shift in perspective on the self is the 
outcome of the interaction of the above mechanisms, which in terms of the DMM, is 
a change in the system concept of the ‘self’, where mental concepts no longer 
comprise identity, but identity is rather with the enduring observer awareness.  
 Hölzel et al. (2011) attempt to incorporate self-compassion into their theory as 
an emotion-regulation technique that somehow contributes to a shift in perspective 
on the self. Self-compassion is an attitude towards the self, and operates as an 
alternative to self-esteem, whereby judgments and performance-based comparisons 
with others are no longer relevant for the concept of the self (since, as mentioned 
above, ‘self’ is no longer made up of these concepts). In the DMM, self-compassion 
forms a system concept that guides this type of thinking, feeling, and behaving, 
which as already discussed, are conducive to mindfulness practice.  
Other Theories of Mindfulness 
 Baer et al. (2006) found that self-compassion was most strongly correlated 
with reduced reactivity, which according to the DMM, is due to the attitude of 
compassion directed towards the self facilitating non-reactivity to experience. Recall 
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that in the DMM, the system concept of self-compassion is hierarchically linked to 
kindness towards the self, recognition of the commonality of the human experience, 
and acceptance of experience. Perhaps internal states are not as governed by 
experience when mental representations of experience do not have implications for 
the self, and bringing kindness, acceptance and a less self-centred approach to 
experience facilitates the separation of self-identity and experience and the ability to 
tolerate a variety of states without needing to react to them.  
 Brown et al. (2007) attribute the overall efficacy of mindfulness to a 
“disengagement from self-concern” (p. 227), where ‘self-concern’ is defined as 
mental events related to the self, or the self-concept. In the DMM, the self-concept is 
decontextualised, and the self is identified as the observer perspective existing 
outside of the contents of awareness, including mental hierarchical systems. That is, 
the contents of consciousness, including pain and pleasure, lose their relevance to 
the self, and therefore do not dictate thought, feelings, or actions. The other 
mechanisms of mindfulness touched on by Brown et al. (2007) are covered above.  
Summary 
 The DMM thus offers a potential hypothesis of the psychological framework 
that underpins the mechanisms by which mindfulness works. It fits with 
explanations of MBSR, MBCT, ACT and RFT, as well as theories that directly address 
the mechanisms at play, in both mindfulness techniques as well as how they create 
mindfulness as a state. 
The DMM and Cognitive Behaviour Therapy 
In this section, mindfulness is compared to Cognitive Behaviour Therapy 
(CBT) to demonstrate that mindfulness adds therapeutic value and that the DMM 
contributes explanatory value.  
To use the diathesis-stress model of psychopathology, it is possible that a 
genetic predisposition may make an individual vulnerable to developing 
psychological difficulties in certain circumstances (see Lazarus, 1993). These 
circumstances might involve the repetition of altered mood states in conjunction 
with adverse experiences, which, if repeated over time, according to the DMM could 
create a system level concept regarding the self or the world. This system then creates 
a hierarchy of associated cognitions, feelings and actions, and their environmental 
consequences, which constitute a dysfunctional stable ‘system’. Mindfulness and CBT 
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seek to disturb or deactivate this system via shifting attentional levels and 
subsequent information processing. 
CBT is currently the standard recommended treatment for most psychological 
disorders, including depression (e.g., NICE, 2009). CBT is based on the rationale 
that thoughts, behaviour, emotions and physiology all interact and influence each 
other (Westbrook, Kennerley, & Kirk, 2011). Thoughts and behaviour are targeted in 
treatment, since these are the areas most apt for intervention.  
CBT acknowledges that thoughts come and go and are not necessarily true or 
false; and aims to help clients to realise this (Westbrook et al., 2011). CBT also 
acknowledges that thoughts affect the way that events are interpreted and responded 
to, and that these cognitions are not always accurate or helpful. CBT, therefore, 
endeavours to change those thoughts via cognitive restructuring. The aim of 
cognitive restructuring is to bring to light automatic thoughts and underlying beliefs 
and test them against reality. In doing so, unhelpful thoughts and beliefs are replaced 
with more realistic, accurate and useful ones. The result is a more balanced view of 
the self, others, and the world, which decreases distress (Westbrook et al., 2011).  
Behaviour is also targeted in CBT. Behavioural activation is a technique for 
overcoming habits of withdrawal, avoidance, and inactivity, and involves confronting 
unhelpful behaviours that keep the person’s problems going (such as avoidance, both 
to internal and external experience, which prevents opportunities to learn other 
more helpful behaviours), and trying out other ways of behaving and noticing the 
effect this has on their thoughts, emotions, and physiology (Westbrook et al., 2011).  
Exposure therapy is another behavioural technique and is based on classical 
conditioning, and aims to change the fear response to stimuli that are not actually 
threatening. In exposure therapy, clients are exposed to the very stimuli that they 
fear and habitually avoid because it provides an opportunity to learn that it is not 
actually threatening. They learn to relax in the presence of the stimuli, and since it is 
no longer paired with a fear response, symptoms improve (via a process of 
extinction) (Westbrook et al., 2011). 
Essentially, CBT provides people with adaptive cognitions and behaviour 
alternatives that help people to manage themselves and their world. The rationale 
makes sense. If thoughts and behaviours create psychological distress, then changing 
them should alleviate the problem(s). The difference between CBT and mindfulness 
is that CBT seeks to solve a problem by changing cognitions and thereby 
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inadvertently concedes power to thoughts; whereas mindfulness on the other hand 
exits the perpetual reactive thought processes altogether. Through mindfulness 
practice, a person’s thoughts and behaviour no longer have ‘power’ over them. That 
is, they are able to observe their thoughts about experience as something 
unconnected to themselves, or re-direct attention away from such thoughts, and thus 
disempower them.  
Cognitive restructuring is used both in CBT and mindfulness. The DMM is one 
potential account for how the mind is constructed psychologically and can therefore 
be applied to cognitive restructuring in CBT as well. However, cognitive restructuring 
operates in a different way in mindfulness. According to the DMM, in mindfulness, 
unhelpful hierarchical systems are deactivated, and helpful systems are constructed 
and activated. Yet, as mentioned above, these systems are decontextualised and 
therefore do not have implications for the self. They thus create a more pleasant 
experience than unhelpful systems, but they are not ultimately in control. Rather, the 
self from the observer perspective is.  
Mindfulness also employs techniques of exposure, but gives a different 
rationale than that employed by proponents of CBT. That is, it is argued that 
mindfulness ultimately empowers people to exit the trap of being governed by 
cognitions (Brown et al., 2007b). For example, when individuals enter a depressive 
state, they tend to attempt to avoid painful thoughts, thereby inadvertently 
increasing them. Trying to change thoughts, while trapped in a depressive 
ruminative loop, is a difficult and perhaps impossible task, because to do so, the 
hierarchical system in which the thoughts reside must be activated. According to the 
DMM, activating a system strengthens it, and results in increased engagement with 
it. When a relapse begins to occur for people who are trained in mindfulness, they are 
able to actually exit the trap of thinking. They can acknowledge, “here are those 
ruminative depressive thoughts”, but not engage with them in the way that CBT 
requires. Instead thoughts and feelings are allowed to be present and attention is 
focussed on the concrete level of their experience occurring in the here and now. 
When experience is not judged and reacted to, it is not as painful, and fades much 
faster, because elaborate hierarchical systems are deactivated. 
There are similarities between CBT and mindfulness, but their underlying 
rationale and thus use of similar strategies function differently (House & Loewenthal, 
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2008). The DMM offers a possible underlying framework that explains how these 
strategies deal with the same psychological components differently.  
To summarise, firstly, both use decentering, yet this is a major component of 
mindfulness practice that creates the mindfulness state, whereas in CBT it is used as 
a rationale for changing and challenging thoughts. According to the DMM, 
decentering is part of decontextualising. That is, acknowledging thoughts as not 
necessarily accurate reflections of reality begins to remove their system from a 
position where it governs behaviour. Decentering does not however reveal thoughts 
as isolated events occurring in the here and now, and thus does not foster the 
development of the observer perspective, or the mindful state.  
Secondly, both CBT and mindfulness involve cognitive restructuring, in what 
the DMM conceptualises as the deactivation of unhelpful hierarchical systems and 
the creation and activation of helpful ones. In mindfulness however, these systems 
are decontextualised, and therefore not necessarily meaningful for the self, and 
hence, not reacted to or given undue importance.  
Finally, exposure is used in both methods, however, in CBT its purpose is to 
reduce negative reactivity, whereas in mindfulness it is used to allow reactivity to 
reside within oneself, and yet not allow it to govern behaviour.  
Key Mechanisms of Change in Psychotherapy 
The Therapeutic Relationship 
The client, the therapist, and the context all have an impact on treatment 
outcomes (Norcross & Lambert, 2011). Additionally, not only the treatment method 
employed, but also the therapeutic relationship in which it is delivered predict 
treatment outcomes (Norcross, 2011). The therapeutic relationship is defined as “the 
feelings and attitudes that therapist and client have toward one another, and the 
manner in which these are expressed” (Norcross & Lambert, 2011, p.5). The 
therapeutic relationship has been addressed in the mindfulness literature in terms of 
the utility of training clinicians in their personal use of mindfulness (Germer, Siegel, 
& Fulton, 2013). Empathy accounts for a large portion of the effect of mindfulness on 
the therapeutic relationship. Other contributing factors are the clinician’s 
genuineness, warmth, understanding and acceptance, positive regard, and consensus 
(Germer et al., 2013).  
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Mindfulness practice cultivates qualities that are conducive to a good 
therapeutic relationship, and it is therefore not only relevant as a treatment method, 
but also as a tool for clinicians to use to enhance outcomes through their direct 
alliance with the client. The ability to respond to each unique moment fosters being 
open to changes in clinicians’ hypotheses and formulations as they uncover more 
phenomena in assessment (Fulton, 2013).  
A theoretical understanding of how mindfulness works increases the 
justification for its use in clinical training programs, and also for clinicians who want 
to develop aspects of themselves in order to enhance their therapeutic effectiveness. 
Evidence is emerging for the efficacy of treatment with a therapist who possesses 
mindfulness characteristics. The implications for the therapeutic relationship - a key 
mechanism of change – warrant mindfulness as an avenue to explore in the interests 
of developing best practice in clinical contexts. Surrey and Kramer (2013) 
conceptualise the use of mindfulness in the therapeutic relationship as ‘relational 
mindfulness’, which basically involves being mindful of the relationship between the 
client and the therapist, and changes therein, which enhances the navigation of the 
relationship and its subsequent efficacy as a therapeutic tool.  
The DMM provides a possible underlying framework that may explain how 
mindfulness enhances the therapeutic relationship. Firstly, the presence of the 
qualities of compassion influences the therapeutic relationship (Germer et al., 2013). 
Perhaps mindfulness practice on the part of the therapist fosters compassion-related 
system concepts, and when these are activated regularly, they have flow-on effects to 
the therapeutic relationship. Secondly, according to the DMM, when mental events 
are decontextualised, cognitive ‘space’ arises. From this space, the therapist may then 
be better able to observe his or her own thoughts and hypotheses, reactions and 
counter-transference, and choose how to respond in light of those. She or he may 
also be more flexible in their thinking about the case, since the thoughts do not have 
implications for his or her self-concept. In other words, the therapist is able to 
navigate her or his thinking on a case with increasing clarity and detachment.  
Freud and Psychoanalysis 
Recall that Freud postulated that effective treatment involves an open 
dialogue between the client and the therapist that enables the unconscious to surface 
into conscious awareness. The DMM proposes that the unconscious is made up of 
system hierarchies that direct cognition, behaviour, and emotion. Perhaps talking 
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therapy helps to illuminate these systems to the client, or to the therapist who can 
then direct the client’s attention to their presence. Mindfulness is perhaps another 
technique that facilitates the process of making the unconscious conscious, or 
bringing hierarchical systems into awareness. The focus of mindfulness practice is 
different to that of talking therapy, in that the purpose is to observe the presence of 
the systems, rather than to delve into attempting to understand how they operate. 
The DMM’s Adequacy as a Theory 
Epistemic values guide theory evaluation to provide an indication of their 
explanatory adequacy and usefulness. This subsequently influences how readily the 
theory will be accepted on the basis that by meeting more of the criteria of the values, 
the more likely they are to be true and accurate reflections of reality (Hooker, 1987; 
Newton-Smith, 2000). 
Predictive accuracy, empirical adequacy and scope address a theory’s ability 
to account for empirical research and the range of phenomena requiring explanation. 
The DMM adequately explains what have been identified as the key components 
operating in mindfulness, namely attention, intention, attitude, awareness and meta-
awareness, and self-compassion. It also provides an explanation for the mechanisms 
that arise from these core elements, such as exposure, insight, self-regulation, 
emotion regulation, and adoption of a new perspective and thus change in self-
identity.  
Additionally, the DMM accounts for findings in regards to both the efficacy of 
MBIs as well as findings from research that investigates how mindfulness operates. 
The model accounts for why MBCT is more effective in preventing relapse than CBT, 
and how psychoanalysis may operate. It does not account for why any other 
treatment may or may not work, and why different individuals prefer different modes 
of treatment. Additionally, the therapeutic relationship is consistently found to be a 
major predictor of treatment effectiveness, and the model does not override this 
finding (Norcross, 2011). However, the model does account for why mindfulness on 
the part of the therapist can positively influence the therapeutic relationship (Germer 
et al., 2013).  
One example of how the DMM offers an explanation for the research findings 
about the way that mindfulness works comes from Coffey and Hartman (2008). They 
found that reduced rumination and increased emotion regulation and non-
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attachment mediate the inverse relationship between mindfulness and psychological 
distress. The DMM explains how mindfulness practice interrupts rumination, and 
promotes emotion regulation. The DMM also accounts for why ‘concreteness 
training’ is efficacious in reducing dysphoria, a symptom of depression purportedly 
brought about by over-general abstract thinking styles (Watkins et al., 2009).  
Another example involves Teasdale et al.’s (2000) finding that MBCT is an 
effective program for relapse prevention in people who have been depressed three or 
more times, but is no more effective than treatment as usual (TAU) for those 
depressed two times. The DMM’s explanation for this is not dissimilar to that offered 
by Teasdale et al. (2000), but the DMM provides an underlying process that accounts 
for this finding. The authors explain their finding through their rationale that people 
who have been depressed three or more times have an established autonomous 
depressive thinking style that is activated by dysphoria, and MBCT is specifically 
designed for preventing this type of relapse. The present model is aligned with this, 
in that repeatedly activating the hierarchical systems strengthens their associations. 
Thus, people who have been depressed three times have a stronger depressive system 
than those previously depressed twice. For those depressed twice, their system is still 
under construction and in the process of being strengthened through reactivation via 
depression following dysphoria in reaction to a negative life event. This creation of 
meaning rich associations can be exited through the use of mindfulness, but it can 
also be interrupted through TAU, because the loop is not as strong. People with a 
history of three or more depressions have both the meaning-creation and the strong 
loop to exit, and therefore, mindfulness is more effective for them, because it is 
operating on the key process involved in their relapse (i.e. reactions to dysphoric 
mood and the web of associations therein).  
Internal coherence considers the presence of contradictions or logical gaps in 
a theory. Hierarchically organised feedback loops are the main concept in the DMM, 
and provide a framework to illustrate one possible way that the mind may be 
organised, both in terms of the regulation of goal-directed behaviour, and in terms of 
how people conceptualise, or think about, their own experiences. The notion that the 
same system guides how behaviour is both executed and thought about does not 
produce a contradiction or logical gap. One possible contradiction exists however, in 
terms of decentering events in the mind, yet continuing to be effected by attitudes 
such as self-compassion. It may be that the point is not to only endure suffering, but 
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to detach from it and also induce more pleasant positive states. However, it seems 
that the key point is the change in the implications that mental events and experience 
have for one’s self-concept. 
External consistency assesses whether the theory is in accord with accepted 
background theories. The concepts in the model are based on other key theories in 
psychology, including Power’s (1973) model of self-regulation and Vallacher & 
Wegner’s (1985) action identification theory, as well as in more specific accounts of 
how mindfulness works (Baer, 2003; Baer et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2007b; S. Hayes 
et al., 1999; Hölzel et al., 2011; Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Linehan, 1993a, 1993b; Segal et al., 
2013; S. L. Shapiro et al., 2006).  
Unifying power relates to when several theories previously viewed as separate 
“are subsumed into a theory of broader scope” (McAllister, 2000, p.537). The DMM 
unifies theories of mindfulness that are connected by the subject matter, but which 
lack explanations for what underpins the phenomena that they all attempt to explain. 
It also explains findings in research that were accounted for via a specific theory 
pertaining to that instance, which did not generalise (e.g. see above for differences in 
efficacy with depression relapse). The model describes and explains the different 
constructs and how they interact. It predicts what the essential elements to 
mindfulness practice are, and what the outcomes will be if these are utilised. It also 
strengthens the use of mindfulness as an intervention because it provides 
mechanisms that are based on pre-established conceptualisations for how 
mindfulness is operating on a psychological level. This makes it a safer tool, since the 
essential components are deeply understood – both what they are and how they are 
working on a fundamental level.  
Fertility and heuristic value: The use of mindfulness in clinical practice is 
burgeoning, while comprehensive theories are lacking. It is of utmost importance to 
uphold the scientist-practitioner model, and indeed the integrity of clinical practice 
via sound theories underpinning this practice. Fertility or heuristic value concerns 
the extent to which a theory provokes novel predictions and stimulates new avenues 
of inquiry. In a clinical setting this may also include the generation of new and 
effective interventions based on the theory. The DMM can generate novel empirical 
research, insomuch as doing so would provide evidence in support of the DMM as a 
legitimate framework in which to utilise in the scientist-practitioner model of clinical 
practice. Additionally, it provides a meaningful and comprehensive framework that 
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can be utilised as a basis for developing interventions that are effective, and that can 
be tested when they are not (since the model provides underlying causal mechanisms 
and a systematic approach to the psychological underpinnings of mindfulness 
practice). 
Simplicity refers to whether a theory makes few theoretical assumptions. The 
DMM assumes that self-regulation is constructed in a certain hierarchical 
organisation consisting of feedback loops, as is thinking-about one’s experience. 
Although this is a useful conceptualisation and many different theorists have used 
this basis to develop many different models of different phenomenon, it still may be 
incorrect. However, the present theory assumes that it is correct. Given the wide 
usage of these assumptions, no ‘leap of faith’ is required. It also follows typical cause-
and-effect reasoning. 
Explanatory depth considers a theory’s ability to describe core underlying 
causes and processes. The DMM fulfils this criterion as it identifies a possible system 
that is affected by the process of mindfulness. That is, the model proposes that the 
function of hierarchically organised feedback loops, which are postulated to form the 
psychological basis of thinking and behaviour, is altered by the key processes in 
mindfulness, of attention, intention, attitude, awareness/meta-awareness, and self-
compassion.   
Summary 
The advantage of the current model is that it provides a rationale for why the 
key components of mindfulness techniques are important and exhibits how they 
need to be utilised in order to be effective in treatment. By providing a framework in 
which to think about and evaluate mindfulness interventions, clinicians are 
empowered to 1) use mindfulness intervention effectively and 2) develop 
mindfulness based programs that are grounded in sound theory. Additionally, it 
provides a framework in which to tailor individual treatment, and to investigate the 
reasons why such treatment may be ineffective – there are logical steps to follow and 
uncover where the treatment did not match the model.   
The DMM provides a plausible explanation for research findings as well as 
providing a direction to disentangle the mindfulness literature over mechanisms of 
change and stimulate further theories that integrate underlying mechanisms, 
perhaps developed from the DMM, about how the mind works psychologically and 
thus how mindfulness interacts with it. The theory does not however seek to provide 
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an overarching model of psychotherapy and how it works, nor does it attempt to 
explain the role of consciousness, or the nature of the observer perspective and from 
whence it may arise. 
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION  
This current paper addressed the emergence of mindfulness in Western 
psychology and the importance of gaining a theoretical understanding of 
mindfulness so that practice can develop with a grounded foundation. The 
theoretical accounts to date were outlined, and the core components of mindfulness 
techniques were extracted. The DMM was proposed as one possible explanation for a 
unifying theory of how these components of mindfulness techniques interact to 
produce the effects of mindfulness practice, including the emergence of the 
mindfulness state. The DMM was also evaluated, and is intended to provoke further 
theoretical and empirical investigation.  
The main aim of the current study was to elucidate the core mechanisms of 
mindfulness proposed across the literature, and present the DMM as one potential 
account for the psychological processes that may be affected in mindfulness practice. 
The DMM hypothesises that hierarchical systems composed of feedback loops 
organised in increasing levels of abstraction make up the structure of the contents of 
the mind. In the DMM, people both act and think about their actions according to 
this model. When mindfulness techniques are employed, attention is regulated so 
that awareness does not become focussed on the contents of the hierarchical systems, 
but instead on their presence. Doing so intentionally and with an attitude of 
acceptance and non-judgment decontextualises mental events and simultaneously 
gives rise to cognitive space and the realisation that the one observing mental events 
is separate from that which is being observed. The observer perspective is adopted as 
the self-identity, replacing a self-identity comprised of mental events.  
Self-identity then exists outside of the hierarchical systems, and the systems 
are therefore no longer as crucially self-relevant as they once were. Self-compassion 
is a system set up in the cognitive space made available by decontextualising to guide 
behaviour in positive and adaptive ways, but it is still not identified with. The DMM 
assumes that hierarchical systems continue to provide ways to behave and ways of 
thinking about behaviour. Yet, through decontextualising they do not govern 
behaviour, because from the observer perspective, “the fact that one can 
comprehensively look at them means that one has ceased using them as something 
with which to look at, and thus distort, reality” (Wilber, 1993, p. 29). Therefore, the 
systems are not reflexive behaviour patterns, but instead provide one possible way of 
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doing or thinking, while the observer is free to choose and create novel responses 
that are more flexible and applicable to the present situation.  
The current investigation into the mechanisms of mindfulness has highlighted 
key points about the ‘self’. Firstly, self-identity may be crucial in psychological well-
being, but not in the typical psychological sense. That is, bolstering a sense of ‘self’ 
that is based on mental concepts, even if they are positive, may not actually be 
beneficial. Instead, mindfulness suggests that removing identity from concepts 
entirely may be a key avenue to well-being. This is not surprising when looking at the 
Buddhist philosophical explanation for what mindfulness is intended to do. Recall 
that mindfulness was originally developed to reveal what is known in Buddhism as 
the ‘three marks of existence’, and they are impermanence (all things are temporary), 
egolessness (there is no such thing as an enduring self), and suffering (suffering is 
caused by clinging to the illusion of a permanent self) (Bodhi, 2003).  
Whether we accept or reject these assumptions of Buddhism, it is clear 
theoretically and empirically that MBIs may be having the effect of encouraging 
participants to recognise the transitory nature of their experience; that it therefore 
does not provide a stable self-identity; and that there is a more stable self-identity to 
be found in the observer perspective. According to Buddhism, identifying with the 
observer perspective would relieve suffering insomuch as it is more enduring than 
the contents of consciousness, but it is also only temporary and will lead to suffering 
if it is clung to. Interesting lines of investigation would be into other states of 
consciousness, such as sleep, with the question in mind, what happens to the 
observer consciousness when one is asleep? Perhaps continual acceptance and non-
judgment are at the heart of coping with the human experience.  
Secondly, self-compassion is a potentially pivotal attitude in psychological 
well-being. It is not yet clear how or why, but it is hypothesised here that the reason 
is because it is an attitude towards the ‘self’, and as already discussed, the ‘self’ has 
large implications for psychological health. Moreover, self-compassion entails an 
attitude that is conducive to mindfulness practice. Taken together, the observations 
and findings about self-identity and self-compassion indicate that exploration of the 
‘self’ may provide Western psychology with deeper understandings of human 
functioning and therefore provide tools to enhance well-being.  
To the knowledge of the author, the DMM is the first of its kind and is aimed 
to stimulate further research and theorising on the psychological mechanisms that 
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underpin mindfulness. This is in the interests of uncovering and de-mystifying 
mindfulness so that it can be more widely and readily applied with grounded 
credibility.  
Clinical Applications 
 The mechanisms of mindfulness techniques are distinguishable from the state 
that they are intended to create. The core mechanisms at play in mindfulness 
techniques are attention, awareness/meta-awareness, attitude, intention, and self-
compassion. Recall that in mindfulness techniques attention is intentionally 
regulated on aspects of experience within awareness occurring in the present 
moment. An attitude of acceptance and non-judgment is directed towards 
experience. Meta-awareness arises as the resulting state. In the mindfulness state 
characterised by meta-awareness, mental events lose their self-relevance and meta-
awareness arises outside of the contents of consciousness and is identified as the self. 
An attitude of self-compassion is then introduced and directed towards the self, such 
that positive feelings towards oneself are generated (but not identified with). The 
self-identity is a key point for clinicians to grasp when implementing MBIs, because 
they need to be able to guide and navigate their clients through the transformational 
experience of transitioning from identifying with contents of consciousness to 
identifying with consciousness (or meta-awareness) itself. It is important to 
understand this distinction because it allows clinicians to implement MBIs skilfully, 
that is, knowing the difference between what to do and what to expect that to 
produce. 
 Moreover, an understanding of the mechanisms of action that result in a 
mindfulness state may shed light on how certain psychopathologies arise. That is, if 
clinicians understand how mindfulness works clinically, they can better understand 
what exactly it is altering to produce positive psychological outcomes, which may 
illuminate what was problematic in the first place. When clinicians understand 
pathways to psychopathology, the maintaining factors are clearer and they are thus 
better equipped to intervene. Furthermore, understanding how the psychologically 
beneficial mindfulness state is induced provides an understanding of how to enhance 
well-being.  
Self-compassion is a key component in mindfulness, and this may be because 
it forms the attitude towards the highly significant concept of the self. It seems that 
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mindfulness has its effects not only because of the change in relationship to 
experience in general that it generates, but also particularly because of the change in 
relationship to the self that is produced. Self-compassion both encourages positive 
feelings towards the self and others, which protect against psychopathology, and also 
fosters the practice of mindfulness techniques. Self-compassion is receiving more 
and more attention in the psychological literature, and may yet emerge with the 
coverage that it seems to deserve. As it stands at present, however, self-compassion is 
a technique that clinicians may do well to investigate and incorporate into evidence-
based practice. 
Future Research 
 The DMM is intended to stimulate research into the psychological 
mechanisms underlying the practice of mindfulness techniques. Indeed, empirical 
testing is necessary in order to evaluate the practical plausibility of the DMM. Such 
testing may involve the use of priming paradigms, for example, that test the strength 
of different hierarchical systems in participants before, during and after practicing 
mindfulness techniques. Testing the changes in the strength of hierarchical systems 
would reveal whether this is indeed a psychological framework that is affected by 
mindfulness practice.  
 Moreover, further investigation is required to clarify the role of self-
compassion in mindfulness. The DMM proposes that self-compassion is a special 
kind of attitude because it involves the self, and research that clarifies how it operates 
is needed. According to the DMM and other theorists (e.g., Neff, 2003b) cognitive 
space induced by meta-awareness precedes the introduction of self-compassion. It 
would be interesting to measure participants’ self-compassion alongside measures of 
meta-awareness throughout a MBI, and note any sequential changes.  
Meta-awareness is not only an outcome of mindfulness practice that enables 
observation of experience and thus responses informed by all of the information 
available within one’s field of awareness. It seems to have deeper implications for the 
sense of self. That is, through meta-awareness, mental events are observed, and since 
they are observed, they are separate from that which is observing. That which is 
observing then forms the self-identity. Following this, if mental events no longer 
have the same meaning for self-identity, since they are inherently separate from it, 
they lose their ability to govern behaviour. According to the DMM, this is because 
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they have been decontextualised. In order to test this aspect of the DMM, future 
research could explore the self-identity of participants in an MBI.  
Limitations Of The DMM 
 The DMM is limited by what has been previously proposed in psychology. 
That is, it could be that hierarchical systems are not reflective of psychological 
structure, and have simply provided a comfortable explanation in the absence of 
anything more adequate. There is also as yet no evidence for the DMM, and it may be 
difficult to directly falsify because it is based on entirely internal and sometimes 
subconscious processes that are hypothesised to be at play. Also the DMM is unable 
to explain that which exists outside of it (i.e., consciousness) and is limited by the 
lack of cohesion in the current understanding of consciousness (of which there is a 
vast literature available in numerous fields). The DMM can all but simply assume 
that there is a property of awareness that is somehow able to be directed through 
volition and to provide a self-identity. The DMM does not offer insights into how this 
may be structured, other than it exists outside of the hierarchical systems and is 
capable of observing them.  
Concluding Remarks 
It appears that mindfulness, as a technique and as a state, has been well 
defined throughout the literature. The outcomes of MBIs have been evaluated and its 
efficacy is clear. It is timely that the focus shift to the less explored areas of this 
current and expanding topic in order to make it more accessible and credible. The 
current paper attempted to create a clearer idea of the nature of the mechanisms 
creating states of mindfulness so that we might be able to develop better ways of 
inducing it as well as working more with what mindfulness taps in to. 
Conceptualising the underlying mechanisms of mindfulness also provides a starting 
point for research on the causes of psychopathology and well-being, a deeper 
understanding of which would enable treatment that is better able to address and 
promote psychological health. The areas for further investigation suggested by the 
current paper in particular are the ‘self’, self-compassion, and the psychological 
underpinnings of mindfulness.  
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